concerning removal of a district judge
How later courts described this case
- concerning removal of a district judge
- preponderance of the evidence sufficient
- preponderance of the evidence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DANIEL, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the majority opinion because of the evidence referred to therein and some of the additional evidence referred to in the dissenting opinion of Justice Johnson. I would also reprimand Judge Brown for the substantial time he devoted to compensated arbitration work which had no relation to the judicial duties for which he was being paid by the State of Texas. While I believe this Court has the power to reprimand or censure a judge for acts antedating his re-election, it seems to me that, undercertain circumstances, a different rule should apply as to removal from office. For instance, in the present case, I would not vote to remove Judge Brown for the acts referred to in either the majority opinion or Justice Johnson’s dissent. They occurred prior to Judge Brown’s re-election to office in 1972. The record indicates that most of such acts were either matters of public record or highly publicized. As long as judges are required to run the gauntlet of party primaries and general elections, I would be hesitant to set aside the decision of the electors because of acts which they presumably knew about before re-electing him to the office. See In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. 183 , 265 S.W.2d 805 (1954).