holding that focus of insanity inquiry should not be on appellant's morality, but should instead be on “whether [he] *14 We overrule appellant's second issue. understood the nature and quality of his action and whether it was an act he ought to do.... By accepting and acknowledging his action was ‘illegal’ by societal standards, [Bigby] understood that others Admission of Storer's Testimony believed his conduct was ‘wrong’ ”
How later courts described this case
- holding that focus of insanity inquiry should not be on appellant's morality, but should instead be on “whether [he] *14 We overrule appellant's second issue. understood the nature and quality of his action and whether it was an act he ought to do.... By accepting and acknowledging his action was ‘illegal’ by societal standards, [Bigby] understood that others Admission of Storer's Testimony believed his conduct was ‘wrong’ ”
- holding that focus of insanity inquiry should not be on appellant’s morality, but should instead be on “whether [he] understood the nature and quality of his action and whether it was an act he ought to do.... By accepting and acknowledging his action was ‘illegal’ by societal standards, [Bigby] understood that others believed his conduct was ‘wrong’ ”
- holding that focus of insanity inquiry should be on “whether [appellant] understood the nature and quality of his action and whether it was an act he ought to do.... By accepting and acknowledging his action was ‘illegal’ by societal standards, [Bigby] understood that others believed his conduct was ‘wrong1 ”
- concluding trial court’s ruling was within zone of reasonable disagreement because evidence that defendant—who had pled insanity and did little to contest his guilt—threatened trial judge with gun and attempted to flee was highly probative of defendant’s guilt and enhanced State’s case
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Tennard v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)
892 S.W.2d 864, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (explaining that evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt of the crime for which the defendant is on trial), overruled on other grounds by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274
The opinion
BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
In his eighth point of error, appellant contends the trial judge failed to comply with Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.13. Judge Meyers agrees but finds the error harmless. On the other hand, Judge White finds no error. Neither Judge Meyers nor Judge White provide any authority for their respective positions.
We considered a similar issue in Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). In Rousseau ,
... Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial judge dismissed one of twelve groups of ten venirepersons prior to the individual voir dire of that group, based upon the mistaken belief that he had violated the dictates of Article 37.071(g) V.AC.C.P., during his introductory remarks to that group.
Id., 855 S.W.2d at 675 . In dissent, I reviewed our various voir dire statutes, including art. 35.13, and, like Judge Meyers today, argued the trial judge’s “mistake” violated the clear import of those statutes. Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 689-690 (Baird, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the majority, without citation to any legal authority, held “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the group and ... no error is presented.” Id., 855 S.W.2d at 676 . At that time, I stated: “Such a broad grant of discretionary authority improperly permits the trial judge to override our legislative provisions concerning the selection of a jury.” Id., 855 S.W.2d at 689 . “By its actions today, the majority ... permits the trial judge to ‘thwart’ our laws concerning the formation of a jury. ... Failure to comply with our jury selection statues is now subject to the discretion of the trial judge.” Id., 855 S.W.2d at 691 .
Were it not for the majority opinion in Rousseau , I would join Judge Meyers in finding error in the instant case. However, as Rousseau made clear, a trial judge does not err in changing, or even ignoring, the statutory framework concerning voir dire. 1 Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 676 . Consequently, the trial judge in the instant case did not err in not complying with art. 35.13.
For this reason, I join only the judgment of the Court.
MILLER, J., joins this opinion.
. I pause to note that neither the instant case nor Rousseau , presented an issue under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. I § 19 of the Texas Constitution.