stating that article 47.01a ensures that "vehicles are returned to their rightful owners if those owners can be ascertained" and that article 47.01 a "does not require that ownership be conclusively proved to return property, only that the interested party show a `superior right to possession'"
How later courts described this case
- stating that article 47.01a ensures that "vehicles are returned to their rightful owners if those owners can be ascertained" and that article 47.01 a "does not require that ownership be conclusively proved to return property, only that the interested party show a `superior right to possession'"
- alleging takings violation through improper disposal of trailer under Chapter 47
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice,
dissenting on rehearing.
I respectfully dissent. The majority correctly held that the Justice of the *754 Peace’s judgment, which determined the issue of York’s alleged ownership, was not void on its face and, therefore, that it was not subject to collateral attack. The majority, however, disregards the finality of the Justice of the Peace’s determination on the issue of ownership and erroneously holds that York’s takings claim may proceed. In so holding, the majority has allowed York to do what it held he cannot do — collaterally attack the Justice of the Peace’s judgment.
An essential element of a takings case is that the plaintiff owned the property. 1 The basis of York’s takings claim is that the State of Texas and Wise County wrongfully took his trailer. But, the Justice of the Peace has determined that the trailer was not York’s property. York did not directly appeal this decision. Thus, the Justice of the Peace’s factual determination that York did not own the property became final with respect to any further challenge raised in state court. York’s only available option was to challenge the Justice of the Peace’s finding in bankruptcy court, which he failed to do. He cannot collaterally challenge the Justice of the Peace’s finding in state court.
Because York’s takings claim constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment, I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing York’s suit for want of jurisdiction.
. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex.1998), cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1144 , 119 S.Ct. 2018 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1999).