The opinion
O’Hara, J.
(concurring).
I concur with Judge Gillis, both in result and in the body of his opinion and I have indorsed it.
I write separately only to emphasize what I consider an essential distinction to be clearly recognized ; namely, the difference between a jury instruction that the proofs established that a party-defendant violated a statute and thus was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, but leaving the question of proximate causality to the jury (or the *229 judge when the trier of the facts) and the direction of a verdict of liability, leaving to the trier of the facts only the assessment of damages.
Assuming arguendo, that defendant General Motors had joined in a motion for a directed verdict of liability against defendant Curran, I would perforce hold that on the record the trial judge was obligated to deny it because of the remaining fact question of proximate causality.
A request to charge that defendant Curran was guilty of negligence as a matter of law is another matter.
As I read the record, I, at least, cannot find any such specific request to charge having been made and a denial thereof preserved. Hence, under settled law, the question is not before us on review.
Consequently, I join in affirming the denial of the motion for a new trial and affirming the judgment entered upon the jury verdict.