discussing Dun & Bradstreet and deciding to prohibit presumed damages in all defamation cases because "the better and more consistent rule ... is to require plaintiffs to prove reputational injury in all cases"
How later courts described this case
- discussing Dun & Bradstreet and deciding to prohibit presumed damages in all defamation cases because "the better and more consistent rule ... is to require plaintiffs to prove reputational injury in all cases"
- overruling cases establishing defamation per se, but acknowledging that false statements of criminal activity can give rise to a defamation claim
- adopting a rule that all defamation plaintiffs must establish actual reputational harm
- “From the date of this opinion 2 forward, we hold that a plaintiff in a defamation case must prove reputational injury in 3 order to recover damages.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. I join Justice Corbin’s dissent, but add that, by today’s decision, we change case law on “presumed injury” in this defamation suit that has been the rule in Arkansas since statehood. I believe we should have issued a caveat that the court intended to consider the soundness of the rule and the court’s possible overruling it.
Brown, J., joins this dissent.