Opinion

Chambers v. Hermann Hospital Estate

  • 961 S.W.2d 177
  • 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1654
  • 1996 WL 898329
Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Filed
Apr 25, 1996
Status
Published
Author
O'Connor
On the bench
Mirabal, Cohen, Taft, Wilson, O'Connor, Van Horn'S, Schneider, Hedges, Nuchia, Andell
Cited by
2 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.2%

Reversed on other grounds by Van Horn v. Chambers, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1168 (1998)

The opinion

O’CONNOR, Justice,

dissenting.

I disagree with the majority’s resolution of point of error three.

The panel begins its opinion and its discussion of point three by identifying the issue— did the doctor owe a duty to third parties in his treatment of his patient. See 961 S.W.2d at 177,186. Instead of addressing that issue, the panel opinion goes off on other issues— the duty to control the conduct of another and the duty owed when a person voluntarily assumes a duty to act. Neither is relevant to the resolution of this case.

The dissenting opinion by Justice Taft properly addresses the duty issue. The only reason I do not join the dissent by Justice Taft is that I believe this Court has already resolved the issue in this case in Flynn v. Houston Emergicare, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

The panel’s opinion unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish Flynn from the law and the facts in this case. Flynn , however, is the only case cited in the panel’s opinion that is relevant, based on both the facts and the law. In Flynn , the patient was treated for cocaine withdrawal; in this ease, the patient was treated for alcohol withdrawal. In Flynn , the doctor released the patient without warning him that he might have a delayed reaction to the cocaine; here, the doctor removed the restraints on the patient and had him moved to an unsecured floor. In Flynn , the patient injured the plaintiffs on his way home when the delayed reaction to cocaine withdrawal caused a ear wreck; here, the patient injured the hospital employees because he was under-medicated. In Flynn , the doctor moved for summary judgment *197 based on no duty because there was no doctor-patient relationship with the injured plaintiffs; here, the doctor moved for summary judgment based on no duty to the injured hospital employees. In Flynn , we affirmed the summary judgment; here, we reverse the summary judgment.

I think we should affirm the summary judgment in this case, based on Flynn . 1

WILSON, J., joins in this dissent.

. In Flynn , I dissented from the majority opinion. Once Flynn established the law on this issue for this Court, we should observe the principles of stare decisis and affirm in this case.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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