holding that where jury instruction improperly expands upon the allegations in the indictment, reviewing court should dis regard expansive language in measuring sufficiency of the evidence
How later courts described this case
- holding that where jury instruction improperly expands upon the allegations in the indictment, reviewing court should dis regard expansive language in measuring sufficiency of the evidence
- detailing the history of indictment dismissals pre-Studer: "Some other defects of substance, in addition to a missing element, that were recognized prior to the 1985 amendments included failure to allege date of offense, culpable mental state, victim's name, enhancement allegations, amount of a controlled substance, and manner and means of committing the offense where it is the manner and means that renders the act criminal."
- first citing Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); then citing State v. Oliver, 808 S.W.2d 492 , 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that an indictment which failed to allege a culpable mental state was still an “indictment” conferring jurisdiction, and the defect was waived); and then citing Rodriguez v. State, 799 S.W.2d 301 , 302–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (same)
- addressing whether an indictment is facially incomplete and analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to that indictment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Malik v. State, 1997 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (1997)
887 S.W.2d 49, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 239
The opinion
CONCURRING COMMENT ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Understanding that while an “incomplete” charging instrument may invest a trial court with subject matter jurisdiction over a cause, by failing to object to “incompleteness” an accused does not waive or forfeit the fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial under protections constitutionally guaranteed by due process and due course of law clauses — any implication to the contrary in Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), notwithstanding — I join the opinion of the Court.