Opinion

Paulson v. State

  • 28 S.W.3d 570
  • 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 89
  • 2000 WL 1468423
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Oct 4, 2000
Status
Published
Author
Price
On the bench
Keasler, McCormick, Mansfield, Keller, Womack, Holland, Johnson, Meyers, Price
Cited by
830 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.2%

Declined to follow by Culton, Alan Enrique v. State (2002)

concluding that total omission of reasonable-doubt instruction then required by Geesa was error that was not subject to harmless error, reversing judgment of conviction, and remanding for new trial

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that total omission of reasonable-doubt instruction then required by Geesa was error that was not subject to harmless error, reversing judgment of conviction, and remanding for new trial
  • overruling Geesa v. State , 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) insofar as it required a jury instruction on reasonable doubt, and stating that “the better practice is to give no definition of reasonable doubt at all to the jury”
  • stating, AWe specifically overrule that portion of Geesa which requires trial courts to instruct juries on the definition of >beyond a reasonable doubt.=@
  • stating, “We specifically overrule that portion of Geesa which requires trial courts to instruct juries on the definition of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Declined to follow by Culton, Alan Enrique v. State (2002)

    However, we decline to extend Billy's (and thus Paulson's) holding to the
    Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)Nov 7, 2002Read it

The opinion

PRICE, J.,

delivered a dissenting opinion.

APPENDIX

All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that a person has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.

It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all “reasonable doubt” concerning the defendant’s guilt.

A “reasonable doubt” is a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.

*574 In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt after considering all the evidence before you and these instructions, you will acquit him and say by your verdict “Not guilty.”

Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.