The opinion
Taylor, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the prosecution’s acquisition of the disputed evidence was procedurally improper.
However, I disagree with the majority that the evidence thus obtained is not admissible under MCL 768.20a(6); MSA 28.1043(1)(6).
The subsection at issue states in relevant part as follows:
(6) Upon conclusion of the examination, the center for forensic psychiatry or the other qualified personnel, and any independent examiner, shall prepare a written report and shall submit the report to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel. [Emphasis supplied.]
As a specific statute dealing with a limited and *228 narrowly circumscribed topic, § 20a(4)-(6) prevails over the generally applicable psychologist-patient privilege, MCL 333.18237; MSA 14.15(18237), People v Tucker, 177 Mich App 174, 179 ; 441 NW2d 59 (1989), and operates in derogation of the common law, such as the common-law doctrine of the attorney-client privilege. The phrase "and any independent examiner” in § 20a(6) is broad and by the use of the words "and” and "any” plainly refers to more than "forensic center” or "other qualified” personnel. Otherwise, the Legislature would have used the word "or” to specifically denote an examiner serving in lieu of the forensic center personnel. Further, § 20a(3) refers to the independent insanity defense expert retained by a defendant as a "clinician” who performs an "independent psychiatric evaluation” in contradistinction to the use of "and any independent examiner” in § 20a(6).
Case law supports this reading of § 20a. In People v Sorna, 88 Mich App 351 ; 276 NW2d 892 (1979), the defendant interposed a defense of insanity and petitioned for and obtained appointment of an independent psychiatrist to evaluate his sanity under § 20a. The prosecution obtained its own evaluation and moved to obtain the reports of the defendant’s psychiatrist. The trial court ordered "the defendant to furnish to the prosecution any written psychiatric report prepared by the defense psychiatrist.” Id. at 355. On appeal, the defendant argued that § 20a "requiring submission to the prosecutor of any independent psychiatric report prepared for the defense violates the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 356.
This Court disagreed, reasoning:
First, MCL 768.20a; MSA 28.1043(1) specifically authorized the exchange of psychiatric reports *229 which occurred in the case at bar. The limitations on their use contained in the statute reflect the Legislature’s intent to facilitate a complete exploration of the mental state of the defendant in the interest of public justice and yet avoid the violation of attorney-client privilege criticized in [People v Hilliker, 29 Mich App 543 ; 185 NW2d 831 (1971)]. . . .
Secondly, the common-law attorney-client privilege is not immune from development by case law or modification by statute. Nor do any constitutional impediments appear to exist to prevent the Legislature from either providing for a specific exemption in cases where the defendant’s insanity is in issue or to so limit the use of psychiatric reports so as to avoid the issue of privilege. Under either view of the statute, it is obvious that the Legislature, in permitting the limited use of psychiatric reports, struck a balance between any possible prejudice to the defendant and the strong "interest of the State in accurate fact-finding by its courts.” . . .
Defendant stresses a variety of tactical disadvantages which may result if he is required to furnish the report of "any independent examiner” to the prosecution, including chilling of defendant-psychiatrist communication and discouragement of defense counsel exploration of the insanity issue by gathering a variety of medical opinions. This position ignores the fundamental purpose of a criminal trial: the fair ascertainment of the truth. People v Johnson, 356 Mich 619, 621 ; 97 NW2d 739 (1959); People v Aldridge, 47 Mich App 639, 646 ; 209 NW2d 796 (1973). A necessary concomitant of this goal is a reasonable balancing of advantages and a lessening of a vehemently adversary climate at trial. We view MCL 768.20a; MSA 28.1043(1) as a legislative encouragement of this purpose. [Sorna, supra at 357-358 . Citations omitted.]
I would adopt the broad reading of the statute described by the Sorna Court to hold that § 20a(6) *230 allows the prosecutor to obtain reports like that of Dr. Chase. Although defendant is entitled to a defense, I do not believe that as a general proposition a defendant is entitled to shop for an expert witness to plumb the crucial condition of his sanity — a condition defendant himself placed at issue —and then to bar the prosecution from using the rejected fruits of such a shopping spree. To construe the statute to allow such a bar impedes the ascertainment of the truth. Given the cogency of a reading of the statute that will allow a full inquiry into the issue of sanity, it can be hoped that our Supreme Court will soon address itself to this issue.