holding in a summary judgment context that when the order granting the summary judgment explicitly states the grounds relied upon in granting the summary judgment and the underlying motion contains other independent grounds for the same relief, the summary judgment can be affirmed only on the grounds specified in the trial court=s order
How later courts described this case
- holding in a summary judgment context that when the order granting the summary judgment explicitly states the grounds relied upon in granting the summary judgment and the underlying motion contains other independent grounds for the same relief, the summary judgment can be affirmed only on the grounds specified in the trial court=s order
- stating that in Maupin the court "held that when the insured’s acts were voluntary and intentional and the injury is the natural result of the act, the damage was not an accident within the meaning of the policy even though the injury may have been unexpected, unforeseen and unintended.’’
- stating that when there are multiple grounds for summary - 11 - 04-10-00617-CV judgment and the order does not specify the ground on which the summary judgment was granted, appealing party must negate all grounds on appeal
- explaining that when the district court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground relied on for the ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are meritorious
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CORNYN, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the court that a fact issue exists regarding whether G.W. knew with substantial certainty that his actions would result in the transmission of herpes to S.S., and that there is no evidence from which we can infer intent in this case. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (1993) (discussing the substantial certainty standard in cases alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress). Thus, I join in parts I and II of the court’s opinion.
I disagree, however, with the court’s refusal to consider alternative grounds upon which the trial court’s summary judgment *383 can be affirmed. Therefore, I join in part II of JUSTICE HECHT’S opinion.