indicating that driving cars, posting warning signs, and moving office furniture are activities for which “immunity serves no worthwhile purpose.”
How later courts described this case
- indicating that driving cars, posting warning signs, and moving office furniture are activities for which “immunity serves no worthwhile purpose.”
- explaining how qualified official immunity applies to a fire chief sued in his personal capacity for his official actions which include, pursuant to KRS 75.070(1), the provision of emergency services
- finding that the exercise of professional judgment is more likely to be a discretionary act
- “[T]he doctrine of stare decisis remains an ever-present guidepost in our undertaking. Stare Decisis compels us to decide every case with deference to precedent. Thus, it is with anything but a cavalier attitude that we broach the subject of changing the ebb and flow of settled law [and while], we do not feel that the doctrine compels us to unquestioningly follow prior decisions when this Court finds itself otherwise compelled, we recognize that stare decisis [is] the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ABRAMSON, Justice,
Concurring In Result Only:
I respectfully concur in result only.
While Justice Venters correctly notes that the record before us is “exceedingly sparse,” the Caneyville Volunteer Fire Department’s representation to this Court regarding its legal status has been unchallenged. The CVFD notes that “contrary to the Appellees’ assertion that [CVFD] is the agent of the city, volunteer fire districts are created through special taxing districts set up by the County under KRS 75.010 and KRS 65.182. Thus, these agencies are more appropriately characterized as agents of the county and protected by sovereign immunity.” (emphasis in the original). Indeed, it is fair to say that the City of Caneyville has no legal role in this controversy whatsoever and thus discussions of municipal immunity, jural rights and, indeed, the constitutionality of KRS 95.830 are beyond the scope of the controversy before this Court. In my view, the CVFD is a county-authorized taxing district and whether viewed in that light or through the “agent of the Commonwealth” status accorded it in KRS 75.070 it has sovereign immunity. The majority is correct that Chief Clark in his official capacity is entitled to the same immunity as the CVFD. Discussions of individual capacity claims and the qualified official immunity doctrine, again in my view, are beyond the scope of this controversy because the Ap-pellees did not state any individual capacity claims against Chief Clark. In sum, I believe that the majority is correct that the trial court properly dismissed the case but I disagree with its rationale.