noting that “‘conclusory claims of prejudice’ are not sufficient to satisfy the prejudice element” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- noting that “‘conclusory claims of prejudice’ are not sufficient to satisfy the prejudice element” (citation omitted)
- noting that concerns about the attorney–client privilege “disappear[] during postconviction relief proceedings”
- holding conclusory claims of prejudice are insufficient to satisfy the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
- preserving claim for postconviction review and stating that “[o]nly in rare cases will the trial record alone be sufficient to resolve the claim on direct appeal”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LAVORATO, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I join Justice Wiggins’ dissent. I would also point out that this case underscores another reason, in addition to the reasons I stated in my dissent in State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 138-45 (Iowa 2006) (Lavo-rato, C.J., dissenting), why we should presume prejudice, vacate the judgment of sentence and conviction, and remand to allow the defendant to plead anew. Under the majority’s approach, a postconviction *242 relief proceeding in cases like this one will now likely degenerate into a credibility contest between the lawyer and his or her former client, a contest the former client will' in all likelihood lose. We should not put lawyers and defendants in this unenviable 'position. Such unseemly conflict would be unnecessary, and district court performance would be improved, if we simply enforced Iowa Rule of Criminal Proce-duie 2.8(2)(b)’s requirements.
WIGGINS, J., joins this dissent.