holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 142 admitting thirteen photographs of the victims’ bodies at the crime scene because the photographs were limited in number, reflected the manner of death, and had to be viewed together to get an accurate assessment of the injuries sustained by the victims
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 142 admitting thirteen photographs of the victims’ bodies at the crime scene because the photographs were limited in number, reflected the manner of death, and had to be viewed together to get an accurate assessment of the injuries sustained by the victims
- holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting thirteen photographs of the victims‘ bodies at the crime scene because the photographs were limited in number, reflected the manner of death, and had to be viewed together to get an accurate assessment of the injuries sustained by the victims
- holding that trial court abused discretion by ordering defendant shackled on basis of generalized concerns about courtroom security without particularized evidence that defendant had threatened violence during trial proceedings or otherwise demonstrated behavior warranting use of shackles during jury trial
- concluding that defendant preserved no error as to one 8 definition omitted from charge—although defendant initially objected to lack of that definition and submitted his proposed definition—because record reflected that defendant later abandoned his objections by accepting trial court’s charge
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Bell, Vaughn Ray
823 S.W.2d at 271-72 , superseded by rule on other grounds by Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 282
The opinion
MALONEY, Judge,
dissenting.
Absent evidence in the record that the appellant was a contumacious defendant *284 and that shackles during the proceedings were necessary to control him, like the majority, I would hold that shackling the appellant was error. Unlike the majority, I would find that compelling the appellant to wear shackles during the voir dire of the venire and during the trial violates the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial guaranteed to him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution and is reversible error.
In the case of Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), although the Court authorized the use of shackles under the most severe of circumstances, the Court stated:
But even to contemplate such a technique, much less see it, arouses a feeling that no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort. Not only is it possible that the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the defendant, but the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.
And, Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring at page 363, pointed out that “no action against an unruly defendant is permissible except after he has been fully and firmly informed that his conduct is wrong and intolerable and warned of the possible consequences of continued misbehavior”.
In Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), the Supreme Court recognized that even the wearing of prison garb by the defendant during trial should not be compelled “because of the possible impairment of the presumption [of innocence] so basic to the adversary system ... that the constant reminder of the accused’s condition ... may affect a juror’s judgment ... [and that] an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.” Id. at 505 , 96 S.Ct. at 1693 , citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 , 85 S.Ct. 546, 550 , 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965).
Placing the burden on the defendant to show that the jury could see the shackles and that the jury was influenced by that fact in order to present error, refutes the requirement of the harmless error doctrine that the State establish beyond reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.
It is to be emphasized that this is a capital murder trial where death was assessed and that a prerequisite of that assessment was that the jury answer in the affirmative:
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
What better evidence could there be to show dangerousness than to have the defendant shackled while being tried?
For the above reasons and because I believe that this case establishes an extremely unfair precedent, I respectfully dissent.