The opinion
MeCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
I join the dissenting remarks of Judge Campbell, but write separately to disavow the comments of Judge Miller in his concurring opinion. The issue of whether our Texas procedure relating to clemency and the issues raised by Herrera v. Collins, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) are not presently before this Court. The sole issue presented by the two petitions for mandamus is whether the order entered by the Third District Court of Appeals interferes with the exclusive felony post conviction authority of this Court and further whether it interferes with the lawful execution of this Court’s judgment and mandate.
The issue of whether any court in Texas can exercise jurisdiction or authority over a death penalty was addressed in State ex rel Wilson v. Briggs, 171 Tex.Crim. 479 , 351 S.W.2d 892 (1961):
“The Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort in this state in criminal matters. This being so, no other court of this state has authority to overrule or circumvent is decisions, or disobey its mandates.” 351 S.W.2d at 894 .
It truly disturbs and distresses me that we, as the constitutionally empowered court to act in this issue, a majority will not defend our own domain.
*879 The comity matter to which Judge Miller alludes was best addressed through Justice Pleasants of the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals:
“It is necessary for the due and orderly administration of justice that the rule of comity which forbids one court from inter-fereing with the execution of the judgments of another should be strictly enforced. Any other rule would lead to unseemly and disorderly conflict between the courts and be productive of interminable confusion, and the results disastrous to the administration of justice.” Adoue v. Wettermark, 22 Tex.Civ.App. 545 , 55 S.W. 511 .
Justice Pleasants knew well of what he spoke.
I dissent.