stating that corporation had no vested right in using “engineering” in its name based on statute that was in effect when it was incorporated but stating that the constitutional protections against retroactive laws are not absolute and must yield to the state’s right to safeguard public welfare
How later courts described this case
- stating that corporation had no vested right in using “engineering” in its name based on statute that was in effect when it was incorporated but stating that the constitutional protections against retroactive laws are not absolute and must yield to the state’s right to safeguard public welfare
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MASSEY, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion will require the ap-pellee to either change its name or hire an engineer.
While I concur with the majority that enjoinder of the appellee in respect to its present name would be proper I cannot agree that the language of the opinion go so far as to indicate that the court believes that there should be prohibition (as the Act provides) of any use of the term “engineering” in the name of any company or business under any circumstances. I fear the holding of the majority is subject to that construction.
The spirit and intent of the rule prescribed by Section 18 of the Texas Engineering Practice Act is to protect the public by eliminating the possibility that the corporate name mislead by indication that engineering services are provided. The letter of the rule would inhibit a business establishment which provides equipment to *610 engineers themselves from using a name such as “Acme Engineering Equipment” or “Omega Engineering Supplies”.
Where the reason for the rule would not exist I would hold that the rule itself is inoperative and improper to be applied, and to that end I would construe the statute’s force and effect.