stating that an un-emancipated minor is a legal resident of his father’s home, despite the lack of his physical presence in his father’s home
How later courts described this case
- stating that an un-emancipated minor is a legal resident of his father’s home, despite the lack of his physical presence in his father’s home
- holding that while an unemanci-pated minor was absent from his parent’s home, that absence could only be considered temporary
- “Even though a ... child might have several residences, despite the fact that he has one domicile, the legal residence of an unemancipated minor ... is that of his [custodial parent] unless changed by law. This is reasonable and understandable because ... the [custodial parent] has numerous ofoli-gations to [the] child [including his support and maintenance], is vested with parental authority, and is responsible in great measure for his actions.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Fidelity General Insurance Company v. Ripley, 228 So. 2d 238 (1970)
In urging reversal of the lower court's decision, counsel for Fidelity contends that the case of Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al., 248 La. 246, 178 So.2d 238, relied upon by the lower court is distinguishable from the case at bar; and further contends that the case of Bannerman v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company, 144 So.2d 167 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1962), should be controlling here.
The opinion
McCALEB, Justice
(concurring).
As I see it, the important question in this case is whether the words as used in the policy coverage of “a resident of the same household” means residents of the same household factually or residents of the same household legally. If the former, no coverage is provided, but, if the latter, then the insurer is liable as concluded by the majority opinion. The result is to be reached, of course, by interpreting the intent of the parties to the contract. If their intent is doubtful by reason of the choice of language used by the insurer, then the conclusion here is proper because ambiguities in policies are to be construed against the insurer.' For my part, I cannot say with any degree of certainty that the language employed by the insurer is so clear and unequivocal as to evince an intention1 that the relatives for whom insurance is provided are only those relatives actually and factually living in the home of the named insured at the time of the accident.1 Because of this, I feel that the result reached is correct.
I respectfully concur.