The opinion
JOY, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The initial consideration, which I think is determinative of the issue here presented, is whether or not the property is exempt as an institution of purely public charity under the Constitution of this state. The question is whether or not the property itself is used exclusively for purely charitable purposes. The Texas Supreme Court in River Oaks Garden Club v. City of Houston, 370 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex.Sup.1963) stated:
“Because of the wording of Sec. 2, Art. VIII, as it was written originally, we held in Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, Royal Arch Masons, 68 Tex. 698 , 5 S.W. 519 , that it did not authorize exemption of institutions of purely public charity as such but only that property which was owned by such institutions and was used exclusively by them for purely public charity. We have adhered to that construction through the years in spite of frequent changes in internal language and punctuation in the section, and have denied exemption of property, not used exclusively by the owner for purposes of purely public charity. * * * ” 1
Again in Hilltop Village, Incorporated v. Kerrville Independent School District, 426 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex.Sup.1968) the court stated:
“To qualify under these constitutional and statutory requirements, an institution must be one of purely public charity in the purposes for which it is formed and in the manner and means it has adopted for the accomplishment of such purposes; this being so, and in addition, the properties which are the subject of the claimed exemption must be owned and used exclusively by the institution in furthering its charitable activities. Briefly stated, there must be a dedication of the properties to charitable uses accompanied by actual .uses for such purposes.”
No useful purpose would be served to review cases from other jurisdictions. Suffice it to say that some jurisdictions are liberal in their interpretation and construction of similar constitutional and statutory provisions, while others adhere to a strict construction. Our Texas courts generally have been committed to a strict construction and interpretation from the earliest judicial decisions. In reviewing the stipulations of fact, it is found that between 15% and 40% of the initiation fees and annual dues paid by the members of the four lodges are forwarded on to the various Grand Lodges which apparently in turn use the monies for charitable purposes. Although the stipulation recites that the lodges give as one of their purposes aid to sick and distressed Masons and their families, there is no showing as to just how much of this charitable work is done in relation to the total use of the property. The use of the property here involved for purposes of initiations, ceremonials, conferring *275 of degrees, occasional dinners, payment of indigent members’ dues and promotion of fellowship and brotherly love, although perhaps beneficial to the lodge members more so than those in need of charity, do not in my opinion meet the strict requirement of a use for purely public charity set forth in the Constitution and as interpreted by our courts. City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benev. Ass’n, 111 Tex. 191 , 230 S.W. 978 (1921); Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 151 v. City of Houston, 44 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref’d).
The majority cites the San Antonio Conservation Society, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 455 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.Sup.1970) in support of the tax exemption. As I view that case, the court held that the Society, through the preservation, maintenance, and upkeep of the historical building had assumed an obligation or duty that otherwise might have become a burden or obligation upon the community or state. In this case the appellant has not demonstrated that the property is used in such a manner and to a material extent so as to relieve the community or state of a duty or obligation that might otherwise be imposed upon the community or state. The purely public charitable purposes and works of the Grand Lodges, if that be what they are, are not carried out through the local lodges here involved, nor is the subject property used by the Grand Lodges for those activities.
Exemptions from taxation are not favored and any doubts are resolved against the exemptions. This is so because of the basic concept of equality of the sharing of the tax burdens by the citizenry. The burden of proof is upon the party claiming a constitutional or statutory tax exemption to prove, without any reservation of doubt, that the property comes within the exemption. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 151 v. City of Houston, supra. In order for the property to be exempt a substantial portion of the use of the property must be directed toward activities of purely public charity. I am of the opinion that the appellant has not met the burden imposed upon it to demonstrate clearly that the property comes within the exemption.
I would affirm the trial court judgment.
. All emphasis mine unless otherwise stated.