holding, in death penalty case, that State was given unfair advantage in the jury selection process when the trial court allowed it to exercise peremptory strikes after entire panel was questioned
How later courts described this case
- holding, in death penalty case, that State was given unfair advantage in the jury selection process when the trial court allowed it to exercise peremptory strikes after entire panel was questioned
- rejecting argument as matter of state law because allowing retrospective exercise of peremptory challenges on appeal transforms "a peremptory strike against a prospective juror" into "a peremptory strike against a ground of error"
- rejecting the notion that an erroneously granted challenge for cause on the State’s motion is harmless if the State failed to exercise all of its peremptory challenges
- re *665 jecting argument as matter of state law because allowing retrospective exercise of peremptory challenges on appeal transforms “a peremptory strike against a prospective juror” into “a peremptory strike against a ground of error”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Richardson v. State, 1987 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 686 (1987)
We find that Grijalva, supra, is distinguishable from this case since the trial judge excused the venireman sua sponte rather than as the result of a challenge for cause by the State, thus depriving the State of the orderly opportunity to challenge peremptorily.
Distinguished by Montoya v. State, 1987 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 681 (1987)
On the facts, Grijalva, supra, is distinguishable from the instant case.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION TO OVERRULING STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION
TEAGUE, Judge.
I concur in the majority’s action for the reasons set forth in my Concurring Opinion to Overruling State’s Motion for Rehearing Without Written Opinion in Pierson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 102 (1981).