supplemental opinion denying rehearing
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- supplemental opinion denying rehearing
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The opinion
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING
Tom Glaze, Justice. Appellee Courson petitions for rehearing and clarification of the court’s opinion in this cause and particularly asks whether by this court’s reference to Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25 , 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), we intended to hold the General Assembly’s enactment of Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-22-301 to -304 (Supp. 1991) is a nullity. He points out that the General Assembly enacted §§ 16-22-301 to -304 with the intent to supersede the holding in Goodman and to allow an attorney a lien for services based on the attorney’s agreement with his or her client.
In reading § 16-22-301, the court concluded the General Assembly’s new enactments applied to situations where the client discharged an attorney without cause. The Goodman case was a without-cause situation — the cause here is one involving a with-cause discharge. In short, our holding in this case should not be read to invalidate § § 16-22-301 to -304 since those provisions were not applicable nor in issue. Our earlier reference to Goodman was intended to underscore the Fracasse rule to the extent that rule allowed an attorney discharged with cause to recover the reasonable value of his or her services to the date of discharge. 1
In addition to requesting a clarification, Courson reasserts his position adopted by the dissenting opinion, that the standard of recovery of attorneys in with-cause discharges should be limited to the amount the attorney’s services enriched his or her client. He claims the “reasonable value” rule the court adopted permits an attorney discharged for cause to recover based merely on his or her time cards. We disagree. The various factors set forth in our earlier opinion have been applied for decades by this state’s courts. Such awards are determined on a case-by-case basis, and depending upon the circumstances, the trial court in its discretion may not award any fee. Courson’s argument in this respect is without merit.
The court’s adoption of this rule was opposed by dissenting Justices Dudley and Newbern who opted for a rule requiring that an attorney discharged with cause was limited to a fee for the amount his or her services had enriched the client. Both the majority and dissenting justices agreed §§ 16-22-301—304 were not applicable in this case since those provisions applied in without cause discharge.