Lyles v. State · 850 S.W.2d 497

in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, it must be determined if the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, or, in other words, whether the court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably

How later courts described this case

in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, it must be determined if the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, or, in other words, whether the court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably
adopting the decision and reasoning of Makeig v. State, 802 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1990)
setting out abuse of discretion standard
trial court has plenary power to reform judgment in bond forfeiture proceeding for 30 days after judgment in these circumstances

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

Superseded on other grounds by Safety National Casualty Corp. v. State, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 641 (2008)
850 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), superseded on other grounds as stated in Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. State, 273 S.W.3d 157, 161
Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasMay 14, 20082 citing opinionsother groundsRead it

The opinion

BAIRD, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. As appellant aptly states, “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to save, not destroy.” Appellant’s brief, pg. 11. In State v. Matyastik, 811 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we noted, “[i]t is well settled that if one part of a statute is held unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute continues to be valid.” Indeed, this principle of statutory construction has been codified at Tex. *507 Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.032(c) which provides:

In a statute that does not contain a provision for severability or nonsevera-bility, if any provision of the statute or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the statute are severable.

In Matyastik , we correctly applied § 311.032(c) and held “the portion of Art. 22.16(a), V.A.C.C.P., utilizing subsection (c) [was] invalid_” Matyastik, 811 S.W.2d at 104 . We then concluded, that mandatory remittitur could be made “anytime between forfeiture and entry of a final judgment.’’ 1 Id.

Today, the majority, purporting to rely on Matyastik , concludes that without the time limits in subsection (c) “remittitur of a forfeited bond would be mandatory at any time after the forfeiture because there is no judgment provision in (a). Consequently, subsection (a) cannot be executed or have any effect without the invalid provisions. Subsection (a) is thus void. We therefore hold that mandatory remittitur provisions of 22.16(a) are no longer valid. Remittitur may instead be done at the trial court’s discretion at any time before entry of a final judgment [Footnote omitted]” pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 22.16(d). Lyles v. State, 850 S.W.2d at 500 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).

To reach this holding, the majority misinterprets Matyastik . As I interpret Ma-tyastik, the mandatory provisions of subsection (a) were still valid “anytime between forfeiture and entry of a final judgment.” Matyastik, 811 S.W.2d at 104 .

The majority justifies its holding by creating a conflict between subsections (a) and (d). The majority states “[i]f subsection (a) is to be read without reference to the time limitations of subsection (c), the trial court would no longer have” the discretion found in subsection (d). What the majority fails to recognize is that subsection (d) also relies upon the time limits set by subsection (c). 2 Consequently, if subsection (a) is unconstitutional, subsection (d) is also unconstitutional.

The majority ignores the fact that, in 1987, the Legislature amended art. 22.16 to its current form, providing for both mandatory and discretionary remittitur. Obviously the Legislature did not perceive a conflict between subsections (a) and (d). Indeed, there is no such conflict; one provides for mandatory remittitur while the other provides for remittitur at the discretion of the trial judge. In other words, if the bond is forfeited for a reason other than one provided by subsection (a), the trial judge may, at his discretion, nevertheless remit all or part of the amount of the bond under subsection (d).

The Legislature provided for mandatory remittitur to encourage the making of bonds for those incarcerated while awaiting trial. As the Court of Appeals recognized:

The legislature has considered the overcrowded condition of most jails and the state penitentiary, and determined it to be the public policy of allow a remittitur of an appearance bond when the principal is returned to custody prior to final judgment. In making its determination, the legislature has recognized that jail and penitentiary space is critical in Texas and that the bail bond industry provided a useful service by assuming the risk of a defendant’s timely appearance in court. When a defendant is released on bail bond, the potential liability that cities and counties assume while housing persons *508 accused of crimes are eliminated as well as the financial burden for housing each prisoner. In addition, critical jail space is made available for more serious offenders.

Lyles v. State, 814 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.App.-Waco 1991).

I believe the Court of Appeals treatment of this case was, in all respects, correct. 3

Keeping in mind the “cardinal rule of statutory construction” we can save, not destroy art. 22.16. I believe, consistent with our holdings in Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) and Matyastik , art. 22.16 should be read as follows:

(a) Anytime between forfeiture and entry of a final judgment, After forfeiture of a bond and before the entry of a final judgment before the expiration of the time limits set by Subsection (c) of this article; the court shall on written motion, remit to the surety the amount of the bond....

(b) No change.

(1) nine months after-the date the-forfeiture-was entered,-if-the offense for which the bond was-given is-a-misdemeanor; or

(2) -18-months after the date the forfeiture was entered, if — the offense for whichr-the bond was given is a felony-

(d) Anytime between forfeiture and Mr ter the-expiration of the time limits-set by Subsection (c) of this- article and-be-lere — the entry of a final judgment against the bond....

(e) No change.

Because the majority destroys rather than saves art. 22.16,1 respectfully dissent.

. Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis herein is supplied by the author.

. Art. 22.16(d) provides:

After the expiration of the time limits set by Subsection (c) of this article and before the entry of a final judgment against the bond, the court in its discretion may remit to the surety all or part of the amount of the bond after deducting the costs of court, any reasonable costs to the county for the return of the principal, and the interest accrued on the bond amount as provided by Subsection (e) of this article.

. Judge Campbell believes the court of appeals "was surely wrong, however, when it concluded that Lyles was entitled to remittitur even though he filed his motion for remittitur after the trial court rendered final judgment.” Lyles v. State, 850 S.W.2d at 505 (Campbell, J., Concurring and Dissenting), (Emphasis in original.). I disagree. The record reflects the trial judge entered a judgment on February 7, 1990 and Lyles filed his motion to modify less than thirty days later, March 6, 1990. Accordingly, the judgment was not final under Tex.R.Civ.Proc.Ann. 329b (d), (e) and (f). See also, prior Rule 329b(5) (Judgments shall be come final after the expiration of thirty (30) days the date of rendition of judgment or order overruling an original or amended motion for new trial.) Accordingly, the judgment was not final and the remittitur was mandatory under Matyastik .