holding that cause of action exists for injured persons against liquor licensees pursuant to SDCL 35-4-78
How later courts described this case
- holding that cause of action exists for injured persons against liquor licensees pursuant to SDCL 35-4-78
- taking judicial notice of a Memorandum of the South Dakota Department of Public Safety citing statistics on alcohol-related traffic fatalities
- "The three necessary elements of actionable negligence are: (1) A duty on the part of the defendant; (2) a failure to perform that duty; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff resulting from such a failure."
- statute prohibiting sale to minors protects them as a class, so violation of statute is negligence per se
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated by Wegleitner v. Sattler, 1998 S.D. LEXIS 90 (1998)
Therefore, the rule in Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D.1982) is hereby abrogated.
Abrogated by Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 1988 S.D. LEXIS 88 (1988)
Therefore, the rule in Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D.1982) is hereby abrogated.
Abrogated by Wildeboer v. South Dakota Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 1997 S.D. LEXIS 33 (1997)
327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D.1982) is hereby abrogated.
Abrogated by Wildeboer v. SD Jr. Chamber of Commerce, 1997 SD 33 (1997)
Therefore, the rule in Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 NW2d 120 (SD 1982) is hereby abrogated.
Abrogated by Wegleiter v. Sattler, 1998 SD 88 (1998)
Therefore, the rule in Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 NW2d 120 (SD 1982) is hereby abrogated.
The opinion
MORGAN, Justice
(concurring specially).
I read this decision to overrule Griffin v. Sebeck. We are in effect adopting the dissenting view therein on the applicability of SDCL 35-4-78(2), and applying it to these facts. How in the world can the author then say “we did not fully reach Justice Dunn’s interpretation of SDCL 35-4-78(2)”? Granted, while that view was not adopted by the majority in Griffin, its mention implies it was considered.
I am not loath to fly in the face of stare decisis and overrule a bad decision or one that is outdated. For all the reasons stated by the author and by Justice Wollman in his special concurrence, I believe that Griffin was both bad law and is now outmoded and I concur in overruling it.
Since we are overruling our previous decision, I cannot agree with the author’s attempt to dance around addressing prospective or retrospective application. I agree with Justice Wollman’s disposition to “apply the benefits of the decision only to the plaintiff herein and to those causes of action accruing on and after the date of the remittitur in this case.” (citation omitted)
I agree with the disposition of the issue regarding SDCL 9-24-2 as expressed in the opinion.