finding that the likelihood of harm was not entirely unforeseeable and so the moving party was not entitled to summary judgment
How later courts described this case
- finding that the likelihood of harm was not entirely unforeseeable and so the moving party was not entitled to summary judgment
- holding that psychiatrist had duty to protect individuals endangered by his epileptic patient
- it is foreseeable that a doctor’s *994 failure to diagnose or properly treat an epileptic condition may create a risk of harm to a third party, and whether the proximate cause of the accident was defendant’s negligence is a question of fact for the jury
- it is foreseeable that a doctor's failure to diagnose or properly treat an epileptic condition may create a risk of harm to a third party, and whether the proximate cause of the accident was defendant's negligence is a question of fact for the jury
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*353 M. Warshawsky, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my opinion it is unwise to extend the law of this state to impose a duty on a physician in favor of unidentified third persons who might foreseeably be injured by a patient’s conduct allegedly resulting from the physician’s diagnosis or treatment. I would affirm the grant of summary judgment for the reason that, as a matter of law, defendant’s diagnosis and treatment of Mr. Hubbard did not create a foreseeable risk of harm to plaintiffs, and defendant, therefore, owed no duty to plaintiffs.
The courts must refrain from further imposing upon the medical profession duties and obligations that interfere with the reasonable practice of medicine.