Manley v. State

McCORMICK, Justice

(concurring specially).

I. In State v. Reaves, 254 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1977), this court mandated procedures for preservation of error in subsequent direct appeals from guilty plea convictions. The present appeal arises from a postconviction attack upon a pre-Reaves guilty plea. I would hold Reaves has no application in this situation, just as it is inapplicable to appeals from guilty plea convictions under the criminal law revision effective January 1, 1978. See State v. Gardner, 274 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1979). Reaves did not prescribe procedures for postconviction attack of pre-Reaves guilty plea convictions, and it is neither fair nor reasonable to impose direct appeal requirements retroactively to pre-Reaves guilty pleas. We reached the merits of a postcon-viction attack despite Reaves in Adams v. State, 269 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1978). We should do so here also.

II. I concur in the result in this case because I believe the plea was taken in compliance with the requirements of State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969), and Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 , 96 S.Ct. 2253 , 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).

We have never held that a trial court must inform an accused of the elements of the offense to satisfy Sisco’s first requirement. All we have ever required in Sisco and its progeny is that the court advise the defendant of the nature of the charge and demonstrate affirmatively in the record that the defendant understands the nature of the charge in relation to the facts of the case. See State v. Hansen, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1974) (“We have consistently held we will not reverse a judgment based on a guilty plea where trial court did not specifically explain each element of the crime, if under all the circumstances it is apparent the accused party understood the nature of the charge.”). Guilty plea convictions have been upset when the trial court has failed in this duty. See, e. g., Hoskins v. State, 246 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa 1976); State v. Buhr, 243 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1976). However, no conviction has been reversed because of the judge’s failure to advise the defendant of the elements of the offense.

The record in the present cáse conforms with the constitutional standard enunciated in Henderson . The Henderson standard allows the court to examine the totality of circumstances to determine whether the substance of a charge as opposed to its technical elements was conveyed to an accused. This is the standard we have consistently applied.

Nevertheless, the Henderson Court held that intent is such a critical element of second-degree murder under the New York statute involved there that the accused’s notice of that element had to be shown. The Court said such a showing could be made through the record of the trial judge’s explanation or through a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense had been explained to the accused. In Henderson , the district court found as a fact that no such notice was given. The Supreme Court agreed on that basis that the conviction could not stand. It is reasonable to believe the mens rea elements of a murder charge in Iowa are as critical as the intent element of the murder charge in Henderson . Therefore an Iowa record must show that those elements of the charge have been explained to an accused before his conviction upon a plea of guilty can withstand Sisco attack. In the present case, the record shows the requisite notice of the nature of the offense was given to the accused through advice of counsel. Thus the Henderson standard is satisfied.

I agree with the court that the remaining three Sisco requirements were also met.

REYNOLDSON, C. J., and ALLBEE, J., join in this special concurrence.