holding appellant failed to establish trial counsel’s deficient performance for failure to call witnesses at guilt-innocence and punishment stage when appellant could not identify specific witnesses that should have been called, that such witnesses were available to testify, and that their testimony would have benefitted him
How later courts described this case
- holding appellant failed to establish trial counsel’s deficient performance for failure to call witnesses at guilt-innocence and punishment stage when appellant could not identify specific witnesses that should have been called, that such witnesses were available to testify, and that their testimony would have benefitted him
- determining that attorney’s “trial preparation was objectively reasonable,” in part, due to “strategic decision” to have investigator focus on reconstructing crime scene and looking for eyewitnesses rather than have investigator interview State’s witness
- holding applicant failed to show prejudice prong of Strickland where he failed to name any specific witnesses who should have been contacted, and failed to show unnamed witnesses were available to testify or that their testimony would have benefitted him
- explaining appellant “must overcome a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’” when proving counsel’s performance was deficient (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 )
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOMACK, J.,
filed a concurring opinion in which KELLER, P.J., and JOHNSON, J., joined.
In addition to the reasons for denying relief that the Court gives in its opinion, which I join, I wish to add another: The applicant waived, at trial, the complaint that he brings today.
As the Court’s account says, the applicant chose and hired an attorney (ante, at 750), spurned the trial court’s efforts to give him the assistance of another attorney (ante, at 750) or to let him change attorneys (ante, at 751). He insisted on going to trial with the counsel of his choice. This was his right, which the trial court could not have denied him.
The careful trial court, seeing that the applicant had chosen poorly, provided him with the assistance of a qualified attorney at the public’s expense.
When it was obvious that his chosen counsel fell asleep during trial (see ante, at 751), the trial court asked the applicant if he wanted to have the trial continue in the charge of a capable- attorney (again, at public expense). The applicant refused. (Ante, at 751, n. 9.)
Having resisted the efforts of the trial court to give him the effective assistance of counsel,' and having knowingly exercised his right to continue being represented by a lawyer who slept rather than a capable lawyer, the applicant may not now complain about his choice.