stating that, absent contrary law, trial court has inherent power to impose conditions on bail pending appeal The Honorable Susan D. Reed - Page 3 (JC-0215) that relate to purpose of assuring defendant’s continued appearance
How later courts described this case
- stating that, absent contrary law, trial court has inherent power to impose conditions on bail pending appeal The Honorable Susan D. Reed - Page 3 (JC-0215) that relate to purpose of assuring defendant’s continued appearance
- holding that the Chapter 17 procedures concerning bail are modified and supplemented by article 44.04 after an accused has been convicted and post-verdict proceedings are initiated
- stating that, absent contrary law, trial court has inherent power to impose conditions on bail pending appeal that relate to purpose of assuring defendant's continued appearance
- trial court abused its discretion to prohibit appellant from engaging in the business of training and kenneling dogs as a condition of bail pending appeal from conviction for cruelty to animals, because condition is not relevant to securing appellant's appearance in court
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disapproved on other grounds by Ex Parte Anderer, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (2001)
See Dallas v. State , 983 S.W.2d 276, 278 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), disapproved of on other grounds by Ex parte Anderer , 61 S.W.3d 398, 405 & n.33 (Tex. Crim.
The opinion
WOMACK, J.,
concurring.
I join the judgment of the Court and, except for the paragraphs that contain footnotes 3 and 4, its opinion. Those paragraphs are unnecessary to the resolution of this case since, as the Court holds {ante at 279-280), the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to this case. And some of the language which those two paragraphs contain is at variance with the statement we recently made in Williams v. State, 965 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1998):
The expressio unius maxim has had widespread legal application, although it is not a rule of law and there is nothing peculiarly legal about it. Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.24 (5th ed.1992). It is a product of logic and common sense, expressing the learning of common experience that when people say one thing they do not mean something else. Ibid. The maxim acts merely as an aid to determine intent in statutes, contracts, wills, trusts, and other documents. Ibid. The maxim has been held to be inapplicable if there is some special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another. Id., § 47.23. En banc.