concluding that it was error to refuse to empanel a jury when the defendant’s attorneys testified as to his incompetence, since the testimony presented some evidence of incompetence
How later courts described this case
- concluding that it was error to refuse to empanel a jury when the defendant’s attorneys testified as to his incompetence, since the testimony presented some evidence of incompetence
- concluding that commenting on fact that defendant slept during his trial amounts to little more than directing the jury’s attention to that which jurors had already witnessed
- holding that contentions involving noncompliance with art. 36.27 cannot be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a timely objection
- evidence sufficient to support affirmative answer to future- dangerousness special issue where evidence showed that the defendant raped a woman who was six months pregnant and who bled to death as result of stab wounds that the defendant inflicted
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Crawford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Opinion on Appellant's Motion for Rehearing), I dissent to the majority’s overruling the eleventh ground of error advanced by the amicus curiae here for the reason that no objection was voiced to the trial court’s exclusion of seven prospective jurors for cause where the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing their disqualification.
For the reasons discussed in my dissenting opinion in Russell v. State, - S.W.2d - (Tex.Cr.App., No. 66,410, delivered July 6, 1983), I dissent to the majority’s overruling the amicus curiae’s ninth ground of error, which alleges the trial court erred in refusing to define “deliberately” within the meaning of Article 37.071(b)(1), Y.A.C. C.P. in its instructions to the jury at the punishment phase.
With respect to appellant’s fifth ground of error, I would point out that United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), holds that the duty to disclose is not limited to situations where a request is made by an accused; the contrary statement by the majority is erroneous, and if Iness v. State, 606 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) so held it should be overruled. See Whitchurch v. State, 650 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Dissenting Opinion).