stating that factors linking appellant to contraband may include, among others, defendant’s presence when search is conducted, whether contraband was in plain view, defendant’s proximity to and accessibility of contraband, whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present, whether defendant owned or had right to possess place where contraband was found, and whether place where contraband was found was enclosed
How later courts described this case
- stating that factors linking appellant to contraband may include, among others, defendant’s presence when search is conducted, whether contraband was in plain view, defendant’s proximity to and accessibility of contraband, whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present, whether defendant owned or had right to possess place where contraband was found, and whether place where contraband was found was enclosed
- holding that evidence was sufficient to support jury’s finding that appellant knowingly possessed cocaine where evidence showed appellant was found alone in residence, cocaine was in plain view on table, and appellant received mail at house, immediately knew why police came to residence, and was carrying $160 cash despite being unemployed
- holding evidence was sufficient to support jury’s finding that appellant knowingly possessed cocaine where evidence showed appellant was present and alone in house where drugs were found; drugs were in plain view on table in front of him when police entered; he immediately knew why police were at house; and he received mail at that house
- stating that defendant’s having $160, viewed in a vacuum, was “hardly dispositive” but that evidence showed defendant did not have a job, and concluding that when combined with other evidence that he was found sitting next to $1,300 worth of contraband in plain view, the $160 had slight probative value in connecting him to the contraband
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOMACK, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which PRICE and JOHNSON, JJ. joined.
I join the opinion of the Court and the substance of its reasoning. I would prefer that the Court did not use the term “affirmative link.”
This term seems to have been used by the Court for the first time in Haynes v. State, 475 S.W.2d 739, 742 (Tex.Cr.App.1971):
Finally, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict [of guilty of possession of marihuana], He relies on the decisions of this court in Culmore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 447 S.W.2d 915 ; Martinez v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 266 , 340 S.W.2d 56 ; and in Brock v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 339 , 285 S.W.2d 745 . Such reliance is misplaced. Those cases require only that an affirmative link be shown between the person accused of possession and the narcotic drug. In the case at bar, such a link was furnished by the envelope found with the marihuana when other circumstances were taken into account. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment.
The precedents that the Haynes Court cited did not require an affirmative link, and they did not use the term or the concept of “affirmative links.” They analyzed the circumstantial evidence of possession in the same way that circumstantial evidence of any element of an offense is analyzed. The evidence doesn’t have to be any more affirmative or linking than circumstantial evidence in any other case. The issue is whether there was evidence of circumstances, in addition to mere pres *167 ence, that would adequately justify the conclusion that the defendant knowingly possessed the substance.
Today’s opinion for the Court, and the precedents it discusses, would reach the same result if they were cast in the terms that were used before Haynes . We would be better off if we affirmatively cut the link between our analysis and the term “affirmative link.”