Opinion

State v. Ballard

  • 855 S.W.2d 557
  • 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 193
Court
Tennessee Supreme Court
Filed
May 24, 1993
Status
Published
Author
Daughtrey
On the bench
O'Brien, Reid, Drowota, Anderson, Daughtrey
Cited by
771 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.9%

holding that an appellate court is precluded from considering issues for which the appellant has failed to ensure that the record “conveys a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired with respect to the issues forming the basis of the appeal”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that an appellate court is precluded from considering issues for which the appellant has failed to ensure that the record “conveys a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired with respect to the issues forming the basis of the appeal”
  • stating that the "purpose of determining competency of the witness in child sexual abuse cases is to allow a victim to testify if it can be determined that the child understands the necessity of telling the truth while on the stand"
  • holding that expert testimony that the victims exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome generally found in child sex abuse victims “invades the province of the jury to decide on the credibility of the witness”
  • holding that expert testimony that a victim “exhibit[ed] behavior consistent with post-traumatic stress syndrome, brought on by sexual abuse,” improperly invaded the province of the jury to decide credibility

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

DAUGHTREY, Justice,

concurring.

In ruling the expert testimony offered in this case to be inadmissible, the majority cites as authority the Court of Criminal Appeals decision in State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn.Crim.App.1989). For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Schimpf, id. at 196-199 , I continue to believe that certain kinds of expert testimony concerning the diagnosis of child sexual abuse should be considered admissible, especially in light of the promulgation of Rules 702 and 704 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Because I also believe that the majority opinion brushes with too broad a stroke in invalidating any and all such expert testimony, even though I agree that Dr. Luscomb’s testimony may have been too general to be of assistance to the jury that heard this case, I concur only in the result reached by the majority.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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