Opinion

Twyman v. Twyman

  • 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 827
  • 855 S.W.2d 619
  • 61 U.S.L.W. 2748
  • 1993 Tex. LEXIS 59
  • 1993 WL 141139
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
May 5, 1993
Status
Published
Author
Gonzalez
On the bench
Cornyn, Gonzalez, Phillips, Hecht, Enoch, Spector, Doggett, Gammage
Cited by
634 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.9%

stating elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress as: (1) defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) defendant’s actions caused plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) plaintiff’s emotional distress was severe

How later courts described this case

  • stating elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress as: (1) defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) defendant’s actions caused plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) plaintiff’s emotional distress was severe
  • holding that when joinder of tort claims with divorce is feasible, resolving both claims in the same proceeding avoids two trials based at least in part on the same facts
  • recognizing tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as Texas’s tort for outrageous conduct
  • holding that wife could bring IIED claim against her husband and could do so within divorce proceeding subject to limitations preventing double recovery

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

GONZALEZ, Justice,

concurring.

What happened to Sheila Twyman in this case involves grossly offensive conduct which warrants judicial relief and the length of time it took this Court to decide this case is regrettable. However, the actions of William Twyman in engaging in bondage activities with Sheila Twyman, under the rationale that such activities were necessary to the future of their marriage, were all intentional in nature. None of William Twyman’s actions could be in any way described as negligent, or careless, or accidental.

After Twyman was granted there was great debate on and off this Court as to the scope of St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.1987). The debate centered on whether the Court in this 5-4 opinion created an all purpose, free standing tort. Also, divorce was only one factual scenario in which we were reviewing this tort. Almost contemporaneously with Twyman, the Court was reviewing this tort in a child abduction context, Weirich v. Weirich, 833 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.1992); as an independent tort, Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 , 599 n. 3 (Tex.1993); and in the free speech context, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex.1993). Harmon v. Grande Tire Co., 821 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.1987), decided after Garrard , stated “[wjhile the majority opinion in Garrard is broadly written, we read it as being directed only to the matter of proof.” See also In re Air Crash at Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport, 856 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.1988); Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F.Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D.Tex.1988).

Therefore, for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion on motion for rehearing in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 603 (Tex.1993), I agree with the judgment of the Court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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