explaining that in light of court of criminal appeals’s abandonment of “outstanding reasonable hypothesis methodolo *279 gy” in 1991, defendant’s link to drugs he allegedly possessed “need no longer be so strong that it excludes every other outstanding reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that in light of court of criminal appeals’s abandonment of “outstanding reasonable hypothesis methodolo *279 gy” in 1991, defendant’s link to drugs he allegedly possessed “need no longer be so strong that it excludes every other outstanding reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt”
- explaining that in light of court of criminal appeals’s abandonment of “outstanding reasonable hypothesis methodology” in 1991, defendant’s link to drugs he allegedly possessed “need no longer be so strong that it excludes every other outstanding reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt”
- holding that the affirmative link between the appellant and the controlled substance need not be so strong that it excludes every other outstanding reasonable hypothesis except the appellant’s guilt
- explaining that Aaffirmative link@ is merely shorthand for what must be proven in a prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, such as awareness and control
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BAIRD, Judge,
concurring on appellant’s petition for discretionary review.
We granted review to answer the following question: Did Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), affect the “affirmative link” analysis used to determine whether the State proved the knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance? After a lengthy and confusing recitation of some of the applicable law, the majority answers that question in the negative: “Accordingly, it is not fair to say that our opinion in Geesa significantly compromised our ‘affirmative links’ case law. To the extent the Second Court of Appeals in the instant case thought otherwise, it was mistaken.” Ante at 748. In other words, the State still has the burden of “affirmatively link[ing] the accused with the controlled substance he is alleged to have possessed.” Ante at 748. Finally, the majority concludes the Court of Appeals correctly, albeit unknowingly, applied the affirmative links analysis. Ante at 748. 1
The majority opinion is the equivalent of putting a new coat of paint on an old car. The affirmative links doctrine remains the appropriate method of determining whether the State proved the controlled substance was knowingly or intentionally possessed. Ante at 747. In other words, Geesa had no effect on the affirmative links doctrine because the affirmative links doctrine stands independent of the outstanding reasonable hypothesis analytical construct of appellate review rejected in Geesa. Because the evidence in the instant case overwhelmingly establishes that appellant knowingly possessed the marihuana, compare Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), I agree the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
With these comments, I join only the judgment of the Court.
. In the time between the opinions from the Court of Appeals and this Court in this case, the Second Court of Appeals has disapproved of Brown. In Howell v. State, 906 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.App. — Ft. Worth, 1995), the Court of Appeals stated:
We have reconsidered this court’s reasoning and holding in Brown, and we find nothing in the language or logic of Geesa that can be reasonably interpreted as expressly or impliedly rejecting the affirmative link element of proof in unlawful possession of controlled substance cases. The affirmative link analysis is not a "standard of appellate review” as we held in Brown, but rather an element of an unlawful possession of a controlled substance offense.... Accordingly, we disapprove of Brown to the extent it holds that the affirmative link analysis is a standard of appellate review and is no longer a viable element of proof in possession offenses.
Id. at 251.