holding jury could infer from defendant’s touching of child’s genitals that it was done with intent to arouse or gratify defendant’s sexual desire
How later courts described this case
- holding jury could infer from defendant’s touching of child’s genitals that it was done with intent to arouse or gratify defendant’s sexual desire
- concluding that the jury could infer defendant’s intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire from his act of touching child’s genitals
- holding that jury could infer intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire from defendant’s act of touching child’s genitals
- stating that jury could have inferred intent to gratify sexual desire from defendant’s act of touching child’s genitals
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chief Justice GRAY
concurring and dissenting.
Chief Justice GRAY concurs and dissents, noting he would affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. While there are a number of statement’s in the *350 opinion that I cannot join, I concur in affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction. I cannot, however, find error in the trial court’s denial of the motion for mistrial based upon what was before the trial court at the time of the ruling, which of necessity must disregard the evidence obtained at the motion for new trial hearing. Further, the evidence from that hearing, only a summary of which is presented, does not convince me, like it has the majority, that the prosecutor had no basis for asking the question that, from this record, it is doubtful that the jury ever heard. I also note that there is no issue arguing error in the denial of the motion for new trial.