noting that foreseeability is a “critical” consideration in an analysis of superseding causation and quoting Scoggins, 560 N.W.2d at 568-69 for the proposition that “an injury which could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence is not actionable and such an act is either the remote cause, or no cause whatever, of the injury”
How later courts described this case
- noting that foreseeability is a “critical” consideration in an analysis of superseding causation and quoting Scoggins, 560 N.W.2d at 568-69 for the proposition that “an injury which could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence is not actionable and such an act is either the remote cause, or no cause whatever, of the injury”
- stating the risk principle “is intended to prevent the unjustified imposition of liability by ‘confining liability’s scope to the reasons for holding the actor liable in the first place”
- adopting section 7 of the Restatement (Third) as the proper duty analysis in a negligence case
- adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts and clarifying the role of the scope of liability
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CADY, Justice
(specially concurring).
I concur with the result reached by the majority, but write separately to express two brief points.
First, the majority holds that the defendants had a common-law duty to reasonably secure outdoor personal property from being displaced by the wind. While I agree with the holding, I believe it should be narrowly construed to the facts of this case. A narrow construction is necessary because there may be a point when public-policy considerations would intervene to narrow the duty to exclude some items'of personal property placed or kept by homeowners and others outside a home, such as patio and deck furniture and curbside waste disposal and recycling containers.
Second, the majority utilizes a causation or scope-of-liability analysis to deny summary judgment on the basis that a “reasonable fact finder could determine [the defendants] should have known ... a strong gust of wind could displace the unsecured trampoline ... and endanger motorists.” Yet, they identify no facts or offer any common knowledge to explain such a conclusion. All that is known from the summary judgment proceeding is the trampoline was “disassembled” and “placed” in the yard. In truth, there are no facts in the record at this point to show or explain how the wind could have moved the trampoline. Moreover, without such facts, the incident cannot be explained by common knowledge. Consequently, the absence of such facts or common knowledge, not an unsupported conclusion, should supply the reason to deny summary judgment.
Summary judgment can only be granted when the facts are clear and undisputed. Griglione v. Martin, 525 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 1994) (stating parties must establish the undisputed facts compelling a particular outcome under controlling law). If the facts, disputed or undisputed, showed the trampoline in this case was positioned in the yard in such a way that a reasonable person with common knowledge could understand that wind could enter under the trampoline tarp and lift the trampoline, then a reasonable fact finder could determine the incident was within the range of harms of leaving a trampoline in the yard to support causation or scope of liability. On the other hand, if the undisputed facts showed the trampoline tarp was attached to the metal ring and positioned flat on the ground, a court may very well be justified in concluding the incident was not within the risks of leaving a trampoline in the yard. Thus, summary judgment should be denied in this case because the facts are unclear and uncertain. It is inappropriate for a court to make a legal determination that a reasonable person should have known or appreciated the ability of wind to lift and carry a trampoline without knowing the particular facts and circumstances.