stating that the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the continuing violations doctrine developed by the federal courts
How later courts described this case
- stating that the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the continuing violations doctrine developed by the federal courts
- noting the analogous relationship of the MHCRA to Title VII, and stating that “[i]t is therefore appropriate that we, as we have done in the past in discrimination cases, turn to federal precedent for guidance”
- where there was substantial evidence to indicate that the purpose of the racial harassment was to provoke the plaintiff into an action — an altercation — for which the plaintiff could be discharged, the discharge may have been part of the plan or course of conduct and the discriminatory provocation a substantial factor in the resulting discharge
- suggesting that an alleged act recurring on a biweekly basis is more indicative of frequency than an isolated employment decision
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Garg v. MacOmb County Community Mental Health Services, 472 Mich. 263 (2005)
398 NW2d 368 (1986), overruled by Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health Servs, 472 Mich 263
The opinion
Williams, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While also in agreement with the majority’s adoption of the continuing violation theory of employment discrimination, I write separately because the majority’s result in Knight seems inconsistent when compared with those in Sumner and Robson. Consistent application of the continuing violation theory would allow all three plaintiffs in these consolidated cases to recover.
In my opinion, the disparity in application be *561 tween Sumner and Robson on the one hand and Knight on the other hand occurs because Knight was decided by special verdict of the jury and in Sumner and Robson the trial court was the trier of fact. In fact, the majority states:
The verdict of the jury, however, leaves us no alternative but to conclude that the discharge from that assignment was a neutral act, and therefore only the "present effect of past discrimination” .... [Ante, p 544. Emphasis added.]
The jury used a special verdict form on which the crucial instruction stated that the jury should find for the plaintiff if "Knight’s rejection of McGuire’s advances was a significant influencing factor in her termination . . . .” Ante, p 523. Compare this instruction to the trial court’s finding in Sumner that
the acts of racial harassment and the act of discharge, although separate acts, were so closely related that they were a continuous course of conduct,
and that
the continuing racial abuse and harassment which precipitated the altercation, were a series of separate but related acts and were, therefore, a continuous course of conduct up to and including the time of Claimant’s discharge.
This is not to say that Ms. Knight’s allegations were the same as Mr. Sumner’s, but that she should have had the benefit of a jury instruction more closely aligned to the continuing violation theory.
I would remand Knight to the trial court to fashion an instruction or instructions consistent with the continuing violation theory of employment discrimination.