recognizing the Court’s authority to re-open previously resolved writ applications on its own motion, while observing even so that it would do so only under “compelling circumstances” because ordinarily “the repose and finality of . . . convictions . . . ought not to be disturbed, even in the face of a reasonable and good faith argument that our disposition on original submission was incorrect”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing the Court’s authority to re-open previously resolved writ applications on its own motion, while observing even so that it would do so only under “compelling circumstances” because ordinarily “the repose and finality of . . . convictions . . . ought not to be disturbed, even in the face of a reasonable and good faith argument that our disposition on original submission was incorrect”
- explaining that when our disposition of an earlier writ “was not only incorrect, but indeed, so plainly incorrect that today it would undoubtedly be considered objectively unreasonable by the Supreme Court,” nothing prohibits us from reconsidering that earlier disposition and, if warranted, granting relief
- reconsidering applicant's previously dismissed Pemy claim, concluding that Abdul-Kabir, Brewer, Smith II, and Tennard constituted a *405 new legal basis under 11.071, § 5, and holding that those cases held that a defendant's mitigating evidence of "a troubled childhood” required special instructions so that the jury could fully consider its mitigating value outside the statutory special issues; relief granted
- reconsidering applicant's previously dismissed Penry claim, concluding that Abdul-Kabir, Brewer, Smith II, and Tennard constituted a new legal basis under 11.071, § 5, and holding that those cases held that a defendant's mitigating evidence of "a troubled childhood" required special instructions so that the jury could fully consider its mitigating value outside the statutory special issues; relief granted
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLER, P.J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
Part of the reason for enacting the subsequent writ provisions of articles 11.07 and 11.071 was to ensure that a convicted person files only one writ application, in which all claims are raised. 1 Decisions about whether to reconsider applications should be exercised in conformity with that policy. Otherwise, we open the floodgates to unlimited “suggestions to reconsider on the Court’s own initiative” that are actually subsequent applications. Reconsidering an application for writ of habeas corpus after a significant passage of time should be a rare event, and should not become a means of circumventing the statutes. At a minimum, two conditions should be present. First, the reconsideration must indeed involve a claim that was originally raised in the application. Second, an indisputable mistake of fact or law that the reconsideration seeks to rectify must have been made by this Court. If this Court, for example, through no fault of the applicant, overlooks a critical fact or legal claim that is in the habeas application and upon *432 which relief should have been granted, reconsideration is an appropriate vehicle by which to correct that mistake. Or if, as here, the United States Supreme Court has held in a comparable case that our original decision with respect to the application “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 2 then we may reconsider the application in order to correct what the Supreme Court has deemed an obvious and unreasonable error.
With these comments, I join the Court’s opinion.
. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Tex.Crim.App.l997)(adopts doctrine in federal practice of limiting inmate to one application except in exceptional circumstances; limits applicants to “one bite of the apple”).
. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, - U.S. -, - . 127 S.Ct. 1654 . 1664. 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)).