The opinion
HYDE, J.
(concurring). — I concur in the opinion of
Hollingsworth, J., herein. However, I think it should be emphasized that what caused the trouble in Yates v. Manchester, 358 Mo. 894 , 217 S. W. (2d) 541 , was the following italicized clause in the speed submission, namely: “ ‘At an excessive and dangerous rate of speed under the circumstances.’ ” The trouble with that clause in the Yates case was that there were two- completely different and directly conflicting set of circumstances, so that the jury could not know from the instruction what circumstances were meant. Under one set of circumstances shown therein the southbound taxicab -in which plaintiff was riding was proceeding slowly as it approached an intersection and was struck, after it passed the middle of the street, by the Manchester car traveling east at a high rate of speed. Under another set of circumstances shown therein, the eastbound Manchester car was moving slowly in a line of traffic, following within ten feet of another ear, when the taxicab going fast, cut around a halted line of southbound cars and was struck as it went through the eastbound line of traffic in front of the Manchester car. (For more detailed statement see Knight v. Richey, 363 Mo. 293 , 250 S. W. (2d) 972 , l.c. 978.) For a case where it was held proper to use the phrase “under the facts and circumstances” see Block v. Rackers, (Mo. Sup.), 256 S. W. (2d) 760 ; See also Bradley v. Becker, 296 Mo. 548 , 246 S. W. 561 , where this Court en Bane held a speed submission good which contained no such phrase as “under the circumstances. ’ ’■
*191 There is no “under the circumstances” submission in this ease. The verdict directing instructions against both defendants herein hypothesize where plaintiff was (Which shows-she Was- in a place where she had a right to be and where; it5 was not proper’(for', the. defendant to drive), what the defendant was doing, what the improper act or omission'of the’ defendant'was,! what happened) negligence and causation. Thus all essential facts which would - comstitute actionable negligence under the evidence were hypothesized so that the jury were properly informed as to what facts -they must find to reach a verdict for plaintiff. (See Jones v. Central States Oil Co., 350 Mo. 91 , 164 S. W. (2d) 914 .) Therefore, the Yates v. Manchester speed submission ruling is in no way applicable ■ to the instructions in this case.
I would suggest, that the speed-submission dn Yates tv. Manchester would have been good- if it had hypothesized plaintiff’s status as a passenger in the taxicab; that defendant Mitchell (taxi driver) -was: approaching and attempting to cross a public street intersection, that he drove into the intersection close to and in front of defendant Manchester’s car at a high and dangerous rate .of speied, and,.that-the taxicab was struck by (or collided with), the .Manchester car,-’ together with findings, of negligence and causation. . Such- :a submission would hypothesize where plaintiff was,, what, defendant was' doing, the improper act of defendant, wbat happened,; ¡negligence- and causation. Those were the facts ess.ential • to the, creation of liability and all that Avas necessary to make it- clear to -the. jury what facts they would be required to find to reach .a verdict’for'plaintiff-against the taxi driver on .the ground- of. excessive..speed.: ■ .(See Constructing and Reviewing Instructions, ’T-rusty; :Sec. 5.) ■ If the defendant should desire a more detailed, submission or .explanation, he should request a-fuller, more -definite or more,specific .instruction. (See 27 Missouri Digest — Trial, key number-256;) ,, ■ ■:
Hollingsworth, J., concurs.