"[w]e do not believe a possessor of land should be subject to liability for bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon unless the possessor is himself aware of the condition"
How later courts described this case
- "[w]e do not believe a possessor of land should be subject to liability for bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon unless the possessor is himself aware of the condition"
- rejecting an objective test of actual knowledge based on what a possessor has reason to know
- overruled in part on other grounds
- initiated exception to existing rule to permit impeachment of adverse party witness
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 1985 Mo. LEXIS 282 (1985)
443 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. banc 1969), overruled on other grounds by Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d 423
The opinion
STORCKMAN, Judge
(concurring in result).
If we are in need of a new rule as to the liability of a possessor of land to a licensee, I have considerable doubt as to the advisability of adopting Section 343 of the original Restatement, Torts, instead of the revision published fairly recently. I am inclined to prefer the language of Section 343 employed in Restatement, Second, Torts, or a modification embodying what is worth saving of the Missouri decisions.
Further, I doubt if the facts of this case properly call for the abrogation of the evi-dentiary rule that a party vouches for the credibility of a witness that he puts on the stand. The plaintiff’s trouble seems to stem from the manner in which the statements against interest were offered. The defendants’ written statement appears to have been sufficiently identified for it or material parts thereof to be admissible as written admissions against interest. See State ex rel. State Highway Com’n of Mo. v. Kimmell, Mo., 435 S.W.2d 354, 360 [13]; White v. Burkeybile, Mo., 386 S.W.2d 418, 422 [2]; Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298 , 85 S.W.2d 400, 410-411 [5-10]; Missouri Digest, Evidence <®::)221(1, 2), and Witnesses <®=>379, 380(5, 6), 387, and 388(3). I am not convinced that the present evidentiary rule has been demonstrated to be unsatisfactory by the circumstances of this case. We should be as certain as we can that the change does not open the way for practices as much or more undesirable than what we have.
It seems to me the plaintiff in this case is creating a sort of paradox. She wants to destroy the credibility of a party defendant on whose statements against interest she intends to rely to establish her case. All she needs to do is to identify the paper and offer it in evidence as an admission *161 against interest. That constitutes substantive evidence under existing law and impeachment as well if the party has testified in a manner contrary to the admission. Carpenter v. Davis, Mo., 435 S.W.2d 382, 384 [1]; Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298 , 85 S.W.2d 400, 410-411 [5, 9, 10].
As must appear from the foregoing, I have not been able to explore the facts or research the law as much as I should to cast a well-informed vote. However, I am not opposed to giving the plaintiff another opportunity to present her case if the ends of justice will be served by so doing. Owings v. White, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 195, 197 [1]; Radford v. Radford, Mo., 388 S.W.2d 33, 40 [13]; Downing v. Dixon, Mo., 313 S.W.2d 644, 652 [16]; Blaser v. Coleman, 358 Mo. 157 , 213 S.W.2d 420, 423 [8, 9]; Missouri Digest, Appeal and Error “S^ll 77.
Therefore, I concur in the result.