noting that while Iowa cases refer to this claim as an “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” neither the Restatement nor Iowa case law requires proof of an intentional act; a “reckless disregard of the probability of causing” emotional distress is enough
How later courts described this case
- noting that while Iowa cases refer to this claim as an “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” neither the Restatement nor Iowa case law requires proof of an intentional act; a “reckless disregard of the probability of causing” emotional distress is enough
- stating that “the procedure under the civil rights act is exclusive, and a claimant asserting a discriminatory practice must pursue the remedy provided by the act”
- finding sole remedies for discharge from employment based on disabilities was under the ICRA and any common law action for wrongful discharge could not be recognized
- ICRA preempts a discharge in violation of public policy claim where the plaintiff alleged he was discharged because he was an alcoholic, a theory available under the ICRA
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur specially because I still am not convinced the legislature intended that alcoholism should immunize an at-will employee from discharge, as this decision implies.