“the courts have no jurisdiction to exercise authority or control or command or dominion over the board of probation and paroles [now the board of paroles] in the exercise of its statutory duties with reference to the parole of prisoners and allowance or forfeiture of time credits upon their sentences”
How later courts described this case
- “the courts have no jurisdiction to exercise authority or control or command or dominion over the board of probation and paroles [now the board of paroles] in the exercise of its statutory duties with reference to the parole of prisoners and allowance or forfeiture of time credits upon their sentences”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OLIVER, Judge
(concurring).
While I concur in the Presiding Judge’s opinion in this case, I think it is important to note also that this petitioner simply complains of the action of the State Board of Probation and Paroles with reference to his time credits on a former sentence.
T.C.A. § 40-3619 vests the Board of Probation and Paroles with plenary and exclusive authority and jurisdiction in such matters:
“Hearings on parole violations. — Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a prisoner who has been paroled has violated his parole, the board at its next meeting shall declare such prisoner to be delinquent and time owed shall date from such delinquency. The warden of each prison shall promptly notify the board of the return of a paroled prisoner *450 charged with violation of his parole. Thereupon, the board shall, as soon as practicable, hold a parole court at such prison and consider the case of such parole violator, who shall be given an opportunity to appear personally, but not through counsel or others, before the board and explain the charges made against him. The board shall, within a reasonable time, act upon such charges, and may, if it sees fit, require such prisoner to serve out in prison the balance of the maximum term for which he was originally sentenced calculated from the date of delinquency or such part thereof, as it may determine, or impose such punishment as it deems proper, subject to the provisions of § 40-3620.”
It is now unquestionable that the courts have no jurisdiction to exercise authority or control or command or dominion over the Board of Probation and Paroles in the exercise of its statutory duties with reference to the parole of prisoners and allowance or forfeiture of time credits upon their sentences. Doyle v. Hampton, 207 Tenn. 399 , 340 S.W.2d 891 .
In State ex rel. Neilson v. Harwood, 183 Tenn. 567 , 194 S.W.2d 448 , the Court said: “The eligibility of a prisoner to parole at the expiration of the minimum term of his sentence also enters into the judgment of conviction but the right to a parole at such time rests in the discretion of the Board of Paroles.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Graham v. State, 202 Tenn. 423 , 304 S.W.2d 622 , the Court said: “Moreover, a prisoner has no absolute right to be released upon parole where he has a clean *451 conduct record while in prison and has served the minimum term for his offense.”
In Doyle v. Hampton, supra, the Court said that there is nothing that the courts can do about the matter of parole.
The Supreme Court said so in State ex rel. Ivey v. Meadows, 216 Tenn. 678 , 393 S.W.2d 744 :
“The granting of a parole is a discretionary matter vested exclusively in the Board of Pardons and Paroles. T.C.A. Section 40-3614; Doyle v. Hampton, 207 Tenn. 399 , 340 S.W.2d 891 (1960); State ex rel. Greene v. Rimmer, 131 Tenn. 316 , 174 S.W. 1134 (1914); Graham v. State, 202 Tenn. 423 , 304 S.W.2d 622 (1957).”
These decisions of our Supreme Court clearly demonstrate that the determination of matters affecting the parole eligibility and time credits of prisoners rests exclusively with the Board of Probation and Paroles, upon consideration of the prisoner’s entire institutional record in each case. Were it otherwise, the power and purpose and effectiveness of the Board would be completely nullified.
Thus, this petition presents no justiciable issue whatever.