stating “[w]e expect that prosecutors, as well as defense counsel, are aware of our case law proscribing particular conduct as well as the standards of conduct prescribed by the ABA” and stressing impropriety of engaging in “clearly proscribed conduct”
How later courts described this case
- stating “[w]e expect that prosecutors, as well as defense counsel, are aware of our case law proscribing particular conduct as well as the standards of conduct prescribed by the ABA” and stressing impropriety of engaging in “clearly proscribed conduct”
- recognizing that “the majority’s holding represented] a sharp and radical departure — a 180° turn — from our court’s and the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as to the burden of persuasion on the third prong of the plain error test”
- stating that, "in the 1980s, while some cases used the Caron standard to analyze unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we also applied the plain error doctrine in other cases of unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct”
- stating that the state must “show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury” (quotations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice
(concurring).
I join in the concurrence of Justice Gil-dea.