“[T]he words ‘terms and limits of the policy’ [in the Direct Action Statute] were not intended to include the requirement of notice, but refer[] only to . . . those . . . conditions with which it was within the power of the plaintiff to comply.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he words ‘terms and limits of the policy’ [in the Direct Action Statute] were not intended to include the requirement of notice, but refer[] only to . . . those . . . conditions with which it was within the power of the plaintiff to comply.”
- “[I]f at the time of injury, the circumstances are such that, under the terms and limits of the policy, the insurance carrier is liable, the rights of the injured party against the insurer under Act No. 55 of 1930 become fixed as of the moment of injury.”
- “[The direct action statute] .has been treated consistently as conferring substantive rights, on third parties to contracts of public liability insurance, which become vested at the moment of the accident in which they are injured”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Home Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 222 La. 540 (1952)
46 So. 2d 122 (La. 1950) (same), abrogated on other grounds by Home Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 62 So. 2d 828, 831
The opinion
HAWTHORNE, Justice
(dissenting).
I am in full accord with the decision of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, reported 39 So.2d 620 , and the well written reasons therefor, and am therefore of the opinion that this judgment should be affirmed. See my dissenting opinion in Jackson et ux. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 25 , 29 So.2d 177 .