The opinion
KEECH, District Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion.
It is conceded by my associates that the function of the reviewing court is limited, that the Commission is the final arbiter of the public interest, that the court cannot substitute its judgment as to1 the requirements of public convenience and necessity and is without authority to intervene “unless in some specific respect there has been prejudicial departure from the requirements of the law or abuse of the Commission’s discretion.” 21
As stated in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60 , 65, 65 S.Ct. 1490, 1493 , 89 L.Ed. 2051 : “* * * The purpose of Congress was to leave to the Commission authoritatively to decide whether additional motor service would serve public convenience and necessity. Cf. Powell v. United States, 300 U.S. 276, 287 , 57 S.Ct. 470, 476 , 81 L.Ed. 643 . This, of course, gives administrative discretion to the Commission, cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87, 88 , 64 S.Ct. 370, 380, 381 , 88 L.Ed. 544 , to draw its conclusion from the infinite variety of circumstances which may occur in specific instances.’’’ Again, in United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U.S. 236, 241 , 66 S.Ct. 75, 77 , 90 L.Ed. 38 , it is said: “ * * * The Commission is the guardian of the public interest in determining whether certificates of convenience and necessity shall be granted. For the performance of that function the Commission has been entrusted with a wide range of discretionary authority. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60 , 65 S.Ct. 1490 [ 89 L.Ed. 2051 ]. Its function is not only to appraise the facts and to draw inferences from them but also to bring to bear upon the problem an expert judgment and to determine from its analysis of the total situation on which side of the controversy the public interest lies.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*595 In the exercise of this administrative function, there is no specification of considerations by which the Commission is to be governed in determining what the public convenience and necessity require 22
It is true that the term “convenience and necessity,” through many years of administrative and judicial interpretation, has taken on a definite meaning and connotes a determination of public interest based on the weighing of the various factors affecting adequate and efficient transportation service ; but this does not mean that the finding of public convenience and necessity has been reduced to a rigid formula, prescribing the weight to be given each factor in any given situation. 23
The competitive effect on other carriers which would result from the granting of operating authority to a motor carrier is an element to be considered by the Commission, whether the application be for a new service or for an alternate route; but the weight to be given to competitive effect is a matter within the sound judgment of the Commission in the light of all the other circumstances presented by the specific problem.
The facts of the instant case, as shown by the record, present an exceptional situation. Greyhound was the only interstate carrier serving this area of southern Maryland before Clarke’s certificate was granted and was the first carrier authorized to serve the traffic between Washington and Lexington Park. Clarke’s certificate was granted at a time when extraordinary wartime conditions in the area justified authorization of two competing carriers. With the return to peacetime conditions, there was an appreciable reduction in the personnel at the Naval Air Station and increased use of private automobiles, with consequent reduction in the volume of passenger traffic in and out of Lexington Park. However, Lexington Park remained the principal source of traffic in the territory. During the year 1947 Greyhound operated at a loss, although between the time Atwood started operations in April, 1946, and January, 1948, when the reopened hearings were held, Greyhound had reduced its schedules from 8 to 3 round trips daily. On the other hand, during the same period, chiefly because of its more direct route over Maryland Highway 235, Atwood was able to maintain its wartime schedule oif 9 trips daily and operated at a profit for the year 1947. It is true that Greyhound’s own witness testified that fundamentally this portion of southern Maryland should be served by only one carrier; but the facts are that two carriers have been authorized to seirve the territory and that the original carrier, Greyhound, is being forced to operate at a loss because of the destructive competition of the newcomer, Atwood, with the result that transportation in the Leonardtown area, served only by Greyhound, is in jeopardy.
On June 30, 1947, Division 5 of the Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order granting Greyhound both routes requested in its original application, namely, service to Piney Point and service over Highway 235 between Mechanicsville and Lexington Park, stopping at intermediate points. Thereafter the hearing on Greyhound’s application was reopened at the request of Clarke and Atwood as interveners, in order that they might present evidence to show how transportation conditions in the area had changed since the first hearing in July, 1945. The burden was placed on Clarke and Atwood to show that the changed conditions warranted denial of Greyhound’s application.
The evidence presented by the interveners concerned primarily the lack of public need for additional transportation on the Piney Point route and to intermediate points on Highway 235. Although the corn *596 petitive effect of the proposed Greyhound operations o-n Atwood’s, service was an element to be weighed by the Commission in granting new authority to Greyhound, and although the interveners’ petition for reconsideration stated as one of its grounds that “the use of the route in question would irreparably affect the satisfactory service now provided by Atwood,” no evidence bearing directly on this point was introduced by Atwood. However, there was testimony as to the operations of Atwood during the preceding year, from which the Commission could form a conclusion as to the competitive situation and the possible, effect on Atwood’s service of new service by Greyhound.
The interveners’ witnesses testified that Atwood was operating 9 round trips daily to Lexington Park and 2 round trips daily to Piney Point, and that the buses were operating at about 50% capacity; that during the first six months of 1947 29-pass’enger buses were operated and during the last six months 37-passenger buses; that seven new buses had been purchased for the Lexington Park route; that Atwood’s operation during 1947 was profitable. No figures as to Atwood’s financial condition were introduced, and there was no testimony or exhibit specifically relating to the anticipated effect on Atwood of the proposed new service by Greyhound. One of Atwood’s witnesses, a passenger who lived on Highway 235, did testify as to his personal fear that Greyhound would crush Atwood’s business if it were authorized to- operate over Highway 235, 'but several of Atwood’s witnesses testified that if Greyhound and Atwood were equally available to them they would prefer to use Atwood’s service.
The principal witness for Greyhound admitted that he expected that a considerable part of the additional traffic which would warrant operation of new schedules would be drawn from the Lexington Park area and the Naval Air Station, although some' of it would come from the intermediate territory on the Leonardtown and Highway 235 routes because of the increased frequency of Greyhound service.
. Thus it will be seen that competitive effect, as well as lack of public need, was a ground of Clarke and Atwood’s petition to reopen the Greyhound hearing, but the interveners did not produce evidence which would sustain their contention that the anticipated new service would have a destructive effect on .Atwood’s operations. The testimony at the reopened hearing's did show that there was no need for an additional carrier serving the Piney Point route or intermediate points on Highway 235. Thereafter, Greyhound abandoned its application for the Piney Point route, and the Commission granted it -authority to operate over Highway 235, without service to intermediate points and as an alternate route for operating convenience’only, in view of the obvious economies which could be effected by the shorter route.
It i-s the purpose of the Motor Carrier Act to prevent destructive competition, but not all competition. The Commission has a duty to prevent entry into the transportation field of destructive competition. But, where a competitive service has been authorized in the belief that it will not be destructive and it becomes clear that because of some unforeseen circumstance the new carrier is endangering other transportation service in the area through no fault of the original carrier, the Commission has the further duty to take stock and, if practicable, to prevent the destructive competition by restoring" the situation to a more normal and sound basis — as the Commission did in this case. The order here attacked is designed to remedy destructive competition -by Atwood, which, by causing Greyhound to operate at a loss, has endangered the only interstate transportation service to people on the Leonardtown route.
The facts recited in the report and order of Division 5 granting the alternate route, and in the order of the full Commission sustaining Division 5’s order, show that the alternate route over Highway 235 would serve no new points, would effect operating economies, and would grant Greyhound no competitive advantage over Atwood, but would merely lessen the disadvantage under which Greyhound (the original carrier) now operates. Division 5 in its order concluded that granting of the alternate route- — -“would aid in the restora *597 tion of the stability of applicant’s general ■operations in Southern Maryland, remove the dangers of impairment of applicant’s ■services elsewhere in Southern Maryland, particularly at and around Leonardtown, and place the competitive situation on a more normal and sound basis.” This particular conclusion is not specifically carried into the order of the full Commission, hut the latter order throughout refers to Division 5’s order and is in effect an affirmance of the findings and conclusions of Division 5.
The phrase “competitive situation” clearly connotes the competitive situation as it relates to both competing carriers, Atwood and Greyhound. I find no reason to restrict the ordinary meaning of these words to ■only Greyhound’s operations.
The record of the reopened hearings contains ample evidence to support the ’Commission’s findings and judgment that .public convenience and necessity require granting of the alternate route to Greyhound. It is apparent from the record and orders that the Commission acted on a consideration of the need of the whole, peninsula and “determine from its analysis of the total .situation on which side of the controversy the public interest lies.” 24
I agree that the findings of administrative bodies should be sufficiently clear to ■enable the "reviewing court to ascertain whether the agency’s conclusion has a rational basis in its findings and, in turn, to determine whether the findings are supported by the evidence. However, no words of art are required in findings. If upon reading them as a whole it is apparent that the Commission gave consideration to the necessary elements, what facts were found, ’and that those facts -were sufficient to form a reasonable basis for the conclu.sion reached, even though the findings be not as crystal clear as one might desire, they 'Satisfy the legal requirements. I believe the simple findings of fact recited in the Commission’s order in this case require no explanation, clarification, or additional conclusions of fact, and are sufficient to support the Commission’s exercise of its discretion.
This case has been pending for over six years. My associates would remand it to the Commission for further hearing, in order to afford Clarke and Atwood an opportunity to present evidence as to the competitive effect of the alternate route on Atwood’s operations.
It is my belief that the interveners, having been accorded a full opportunity to present evidence as to the competitive effect of a new service over Highway 235 and having failed to present convincing evidence on that point, should not now be permitted to reopen the proceedings and delay further Greyhound’s authority to operate over Highway 235 as an alternate route, which necessarily would have a less detrimental effect on Atwood’s operation than new service would have had.
“Whether a hearing was full, must be determined by the character of the hearing, not by that of the order entered thereon. A full hearing is one in which ample opportunity is afforded to all parties to make, by evidence and argument, a showing fairly adequate to establish the propriety or impropriety, from the standpoint of justice and law, of the step asked to be taken.” 25 That the Commission chose to deny the exact authority requested in Greyhound’s application and, deciding the issue of public need in Atwood's favor, granted the authority which in its judgment was fair tó Greyhound, Atwood, and the public to be served, in the light of all the facts revealed by two days of testimony, does not alter the fact that Atwood and Clarke had a full and fair opportunity to present their contentions and evidence respecting the present transportation situation in the area in question. 26
It is my belief that administrative proceedings should be brought to an end within a reasonable period of time, and should *598 not be prolonged by the court’s interference where the record indicates tjiat all parties have been accorded due process and the administrative body has not exercised its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously or exceeded its authority.
For the foregoing reasons I would deny plaintiffs’ complaint for injunction and sustain the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
. United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 536 , 66 S.Ct. 687 , 90 L.Ed. 821 .
. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 35, 42 , 51 S.Ct. 337 , 75 L.Ed. 824 ; State of Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 169 , 46 S.Ct. 452 , 70 L.Ed. 878 .
. Pyramid Moving Co. v. United States, D.C., 57 F.Supp. 278 , affirmed 322 U.S. 715 , 64 S.Ct. 1279 , 88 L.Ed. 1557 : “Facts vary with cases, and the Commission may properly reach varying conclusions therefrom, and it may, within the exercise of the power's entrusted to it, vary its standards and principles of judgment.”
. United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., supra [ 236 U.S. 236 , 66 S.Ct. 77 ],
. The New England Divisions- Case (Akron C. & Y. R. Co. v. United States), 261 U.S. 184, 200 , 43 S.Ct. 270, 277 , 67 L.Ed. 005 .
. Consolidated Ereightways v. United States, D.C., 83 E.Supp. 811, 814.