holding that "as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity" test is no longer viable for determining reasonable suspicion, and overruling Montano and other cases to extent that they contradict that holding
How later courts described this case
- holding that "as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity" test is no longer viable for determining reasonable suspicion, and overruling Montano and other cases to extent that they contradict that holding
- concluding that officer may briefly detain person for investigative purposes if officer has reasonable suspicion, under totality of circumstances, to believe that person has been, is, or will be engaged in criminal activity
- holding that “there may be instances when a person’s conduct viewed in a vacuum, appears purely innocent, yet when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, those actions give rise to reasonable suspicion”
- holding that Athere may be instances when a person=s conduct viewed in a vacuum, appears purely innocent, yet when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, those actions give rise to reasonable suspicion@
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OVERSTREET, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to the overruling of the use of the “as consistent with innocent activity” construct in determining reasonable suspicion. The majority’s decision to abolish that factor effectively does away with the concept of reasonable suspicion being necessary for a Terry stop detention.
The majority’s holding means that innocent activity justifies a Terry stop detention because innocent activity could provide reasonable suspicion for criminal activity. A person can innocently walk down the street, yet such innocent walking could in actuality be criminal activity, e.g. the person could be walking away from a crime; thus the majority’s position is that such innocent walking provides reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop detention. Therefore, anyone innocently walking down the street is subject to being stopped, detained and questioned because such innocent activity may in fact be criminal and the majority believes that such provides reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. But is it really “reasonable” to believe that criminal activity is afoot when someone is simply engaged in innocent activity? I disagree.
Because the majority holding eviscerates the time-honored constitutional standard for determining reasonable suspicion, and effectively provides that any activity, even innocent activity, provides reasonable suspicion, I dissent.