Opinion

Doe v. Swank

  • 332 F. Supp. 61
Court
District Court, N.D. Illinois
Filed
Dec 14, 1971
Status
Published
Author
Marovitz
On the bench
Kerner, Lynch, Marovitz
Cited by
31 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.7%

denial of aid to mother of child who refuses to cooperate with State’s Attorney in identifying putative father held unconstitutional. Retroactive relief awarded

How later courts described this case

  • denial of aid to mother of child who refuses to cooperate with State’s Attorney in identifying putative father held unconstitutional. Retroactive relief awarded

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MAROVITZ, District Judge

(dissenting).

This case is yet another example of an unfortunate situation, the resolution of which has split federal panels across the country. Compare Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971) (Kilkenny, C. J., dissenting); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp. 761 (D.Conn.1969) (Claire, J., dissenting) appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 , 90 S.Ct. 641 , 24 L.Ed.2d 677 (1970), with Saiz v. Goodwin, 325 F.Supp. 23 (D.N.M.1971); see also, Woods v. Miller, 318 F.Supp. 510 (W.D.Pa.1971).

Since the basic issues have been covered in at least three other cases, our comments, in dissent, will not be extensive. We would say, however, that the decision in this case is not clearly mandated by statute, for the legislative program seemingly has two essentially equal, and in this case somewhat conflicting, goals: the support of needy and dependent children and the fostering of various state plans to develop a welfare recipient’s means of support.

No one likes to see a poor child suffer for the misfeasance or nonfeasance of its mother. At the same time, if a mother is going to exercise her privilege to receive welfare payments from the state for her child, then it would seem she should exercise her responsibility to assist the state in its efforts, required by federal law, to obtain support for her child. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 321-322 , 91 S.Ct. 381 , 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971). Indeed, what other or more reasonable way is there for the state to fulfill its obligation under 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (17) (A) to identify the father of the needy child in order to obtain support for it?

Basically, then, a judgment must be made of the competing legal and social factors present in this situation. Our opinion is that the state’s approach is not violative of any congressional directive. The state government and the people it represents have a legitimate interest in minimizing rising welfare payments. Wyman v. James, supra at 318-320 , 91 S.Ct. 381 . The challenged state tactic of requiring the name of the absent father, where known by the recipient mother, seems reasonably calculated to achieve the goal of obtaining support for the otherwise dependent family. Nor are the Constitutional challenges fatal to the state’s program. The most serious issue raised concerns the problem of self-incrimination. However, any information which was elicited under the threat of losing welfare payments could not be considered voluntary, and would be inadmissible in a subsequent prosecution for adultery, for example.

We conclude that the state’s request for the putative father’s identity is a limited and practical disclosure requirement, “a reasonable administrative tool; that it serves a valid and proper administrative purpose for the dispensation of the AFDC program; (and) that it is not an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. * * * ” Wyman v. James, supra at 326 , 91 S.Ct. 381 ; Saiz v. Goodwin, su pra; Doe v. Shapiro, supra, 302 F.Supp. at 768-771 (Claire, J., dissenting) .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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