Opinion

State Bar of Tex. v. Heard

  • 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 572
  • 603 S.W.2d 829
  • 1980 Tex. LEXIS 363
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Jul 30, 1980
Status
Published
Author
Greenhill
On the bench
Spears, Pope, Campbell, Greenhill
Cited by
328 cases

stating that the substance of a pleading for relief should be considered to determine the nature of the pleading, rather than considering merely the title or form given to it

How later courts described this case

  • stating that the substance of a pleading for relief should be considered to determine the nature of the pleading, rather than considering merely the title or form given to it
  • explaining that “[w]e look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it”
  • holding that courts look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it
  • holding that a court looks to the substance of a plea for relief, not merely the title, to determine the nature of a pleading

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

GREENHILL, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

I agree with the dissenting opinion.

This court cannot, and should not, supervise by mandamus, the actions of all the trial courts in this State. This court, partially for that reason, has not heretofore issued a mandamus for denial of a summary *838 judgment and should decline to do so here. There are, in my opinion, other ways in which the State Bar could have obtained the relief it sought.

Lest I be misunderstood, however, I think it should be stated that, in my opinion, Judge Heard erred in failing to suspend the license of Ronald Pruitt. The statute says that upon a conviction in any court of competent jurisdiction of any felony involving moral turpitude, “the district court . shall enter our order suspending the attorney . . . .” In my opinion the Legislature intended that “shall” means “shall” and not “may.”

This means that the license shall be suspended upon a conviction in a trial court. It does not mean that the license shall not be suspended until the conviction is affirmed. The statute provides for disbarment, not suspension, upon an affirmance of the conviction. And, as the majority opinion states, the conviction of mail fraud is clearly the conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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