“Thus, when we review the cases around the country deciding the issue of common law dram shop liability, the legal battle is largely over.”
How later courts described this case
- “Thus, when we review the cases around the country deciding the issue of common law dram shop liability, the legal battle is largely over.”
- every person owes a duty to every other person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to prevent foreseeable injury-club which served alcohol to intoxicated patron liable to person later driven into by patron
- superseded by statute on other grounds
- where a state drum shop statute imposes a specific duty of care where serving alcohol to an intoxicated person
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by DeStock 14, Inc. v. Logsdon, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 81 (1999)
736 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ky. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by DeStock No. 14, Inc. v. Logsdon, 993 S.W.2d 952
Superseded by statute, as recognized in DeStock 14, Inc. v. Logsdon
736 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Ky. 1987), superseded by statute as stated in DeStock No. 14, Inc. v. Logsdon, 993 S.W.2d 952
The opinion
*337 STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the thrust of the dissent by Justice Yance that a rule of law that has achieved the status of public policy should be addressed by the legislature. However, an analysis of the majority opinion is disturbing to me for the reason that I cannot ascertain the fundamental basis of the opinion.
First, the majority appears to say that maybe Pike v. George, by inference, overruled the long line of cases by this court which rejected “dram shop liability.” Pike acknowledged the rule in this state but apparently turned on the fact that the injured plaintiff was a minor. Also, it is plainly stated that the reason for the holding was that the facts were not fully stated and that we were unwilling to say that there were no circumstances under which a licensee may be held responsible in damages proximately resulting from a violation of KRS 244.080.
It is interesting that in Pike the parties concede that Kentucky does not have a dram shop act. Also, the holding of possible liability is presumed on a violation of the statute which by its terms applies to customers and not to third parties injured by a customer.
With a quantum leap the majority also concludes that maybe the statute applies to bootleggers as well, although the statute does not say so. A majority that can reach such a conclusion would have no difficulty in stretching the statute to surmise that it must also encompass third parties injured by the intoxicated customers. This theory results in this court enacting a dram shop statute.
As I said, I cannot understand the basis for the majority holding. To say that Pike does much of anything to existing law distorts the holding. None of the prior cases were overruled then or now.
The footnote in the appendix which states that Pike recognized common law dram shop liability merely illustrates that the authors of those opinions and law review articles had not bothered to read Pike.
As to the liability of social hosts, I can only ask: What happened to “the concept of liability for negligence expresses a universal duty owed by all to all,” expressed earlier in the opinion?
The very idea that the distinction between the duty of care owed to a business invitee and the duty owed to a social licensee would make any difference in liability to a third party is a curiosity.
The majority is correct that KRS 244.-080(2) establishes a standard of care owed to a business invitee. This simply proves that all of the talk in the majority about liability to a third person based on the statute is a court amendment to the act.
Logically, there can be no difference in the liability of a social host and a dram shop. The principles are exactly the same, and the injured third party is just as injured by one as the other.
I must confess I have been unable to follow the reasoning of the majority.
Accordingly, I dissent.