holding that, because termination of parental rights “is complete, final, irrevocable and divests for all time [the natural right of a parent], the evidence in support of termination must be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, because termination of parental rights “is complete, final, irrevocable and divests for all time [the natural right of a parent], the evidence in support of termination must be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights”
- holding that because termination of parental rights “is complete, final, irrevocable, and divests for all time that natural right . . . [,] the evidence in support of termination must be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights”
- holding, in termination case involving question of whether mother voluntarily abandoned her children, that “provide” under section 161.001(b) includes “make arrangements for adequate support” of child and does not require personal support of child
- holding that a pro se answer filed by alleged father, in which he claims to be an indigent parent and requests the appointment of an attorney, constitutes an admission of paternity
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Sue Roderick v. Billy Ray Tabor and Glenda Jane Tabor (1999)
holding in Holick was limited to its facts, 685 S.W.2d at 21, and the facts in this case are
The opinion
WALLACE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion clearly misconstrues both the obvious intent and the plain meaning of Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1984). It is a rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute is presumed to have a specific purpose. Likewise, every word excluded from a statute must be presumed to have been excluded for a particular reason. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.1981).
We must presume the Legislature intended that termination of the parent-child relationship may be granted when: (1) the parent leaves the child with one not a parent ... without expressing an intent to return without providing for the adequate support of the child and remains away three months; or, (2) the parent leaves the child with a parent, or another ... without providing adequate support of the child and remains away for at least six months. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 15.02(1)(B) and § 15.-02(1)(C). The crucial words expressly adopted in the first instance are, “without expressing an intention to return” and “without providing for” the adequate support of the child; whereas, in the latter situation the language is “without providing adequate support.”
*22 In comparing § 15.02(1)(A), (B) and (C), it will be noted that there is no time delay before suit is required if a parent leaves and expresses an intent not to return. Three months absence is required before termination where the child is left with someone other than a parent and no provision for support is made. The time period expands to six months even if the child is left with the other parent and no support is provided. The Tex.Fam.Code coordinates a progression of conduct with lengthened delays. The omission of “for” from § 15.-02(1)(C) was logically intended.
These provisions do not authorize termination only in the case of the acutely indigent. Termination of the parent-child relationship is authorized in any situation where the parents meet the legislative requirements for termination through poverty, neglect, abuse or any other condition falling within these sections.
Denying termination in this instance ignores those situations where the best interest of the child is served by termination of the parent-child relationship. In this case, the trial court found that the best interest of the child would be served by the stable, loving environment of the Smiths. This finding was not contested by Ms. Holick. While it is true that the parent-child bond is very strong, it is not true that all parents provide for the best interest of their children.
A common thread running through the Tex.Fam.Code is protection of the “best interest of the child.” The express language of the provisions regarding termination of the parent-child relationship should be followed when the trial court finds that to do so would be in the best interest of the child.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgments of the courts below and render judgment that the termination and adoption be granted.
McGEE and KILGARLIN, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.