The opinion
Bronson, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result *475 reached by the majority but believe my colleagues reach the right result for the wrong reasons in Part III.
This Court recently adopted a rule of law with regard to zoning which in essence states that where a property owner can point to an external state policy favoring his particular land use, then the municipality has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the exclusion. Bristow v Woodhaven, 35 Mich App 205 (1971) (mobile home parks); Simmons v Royal Oak, 38 Mich App 496 (1972) (multiple residential dwellings).
The doctrine of preferred use has its origins in the efforts of our courts to preserve our state’s natural resources. Michigan courts have stressed the importance of not destroying or withholding the right to secure needed natural resources from one’s property unless dire consequences will result therefrom. North Muskegon v Miller, 249 Mich 52 (1929); Certain-Teed Products Corp v Paris Twp, 351 Mich 434 (1958). The rule, as it applies to natural resources, was best stated in Lyon Sand & Gravel Co v Oakland Twp, 33 Mich App 614, 617-618 (1971):
" 'Where needed natural resources are known to exist in usable quantity their utilization should be permitted in a manner compatible with the present use of adjacent lands. The taking should not interfere with the reasonable use of neighboring properties but outright prohibition of the taking is in fact confiscation rather than conservation.’ ”
Merely stating the rule does not solve the problem in the instant case. Where natural resources are involved the property owner, must establish a prima facie case that needed natural resources exist in usable quantities on his land and that it can be removed in a manner compatible with the *476 present use of adjacent lands. Once such a case is established, the burden shifts to the municipality. Plaintiffs have failed to prove their prima facie case. There is no evidence as to how much sand exists on the property; how it will be removed so as not to injure nearby parks and residences, and how long the mining would continue. Other than plaintiffs’ unsupported statements, there is no evidence as to what type of sand exists on the property or whether it is needed by the state as plaintiffs allege. On such a record, I am compelled to affirm.