noting with approval that an additional reason for the lower court’s decision to deny exemption is the fact that the physicians’ office building leased by the Association to doctors engaged in private practice is in competition with other tax-paying medical facilities in the county
How later courts described this case
- noting with approval that an additional reason for the lower court’s decision to deny exemption is the fact that the physicians’ office building leased by the Association to doctors engaged in private practice is in competition with other tax-paying medical facilities in the county
- affirming the denial of a tax exemption for public property being leased by the county to a not-for-profit association
- challenge to taxable amount assessed on real property claimed to be tax exempt
- “[T]he determining 4 factor for tax-exemption purposes is the actual use to which the property is put.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Tom Glaze, Justice, concurring. Although Crittenden Hospital Association contends that estoppel applies in this case, I thoroughly disagree. The Association’s argument is based upon the county having leased the hospital office building to the Association and thereby agreeing “no part of the leased premises would be subject to ad valorem taxation.” The tax assessor was not a party to the lease.
This court has held that a government entity can be estopped to deny the authorized acts of its officers, but it cannot be estopped by the unauthorized acts of its officers. See Miller v. City of Lake City, 302 Ark. 267 , 789 S.W.2d 440 (1990); Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 297 Ark. 385 , 762 S.W.2d 338 (1988); Greene County v. Paragould, 166 Ark. 192 , 265 S.W.2d 839 (1924).
Here, the county court and the county judge leased the premises to the Association without the tax assessor joining in the agreement. Nevertheless, the assessor is the county officer who is mandated by law to assess and place a value on all real properties. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 26-26-301 -1306 (Repl. 1992) and (Supp. 1995). Simply put, neither the county court nor the county judge was authorized to agree to dispense with the imposition of an ad valorem tax on the leased premises. Consequently, under a long line of Arkansas case law, estoppel is not applicable to the circumstances described in this case. I join in the majority opinion on the other points with these added thoughts regarding estoppel.
Imber, J., joins this concurrence.