holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance
How later courts described this case
- holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance
- grief, mental anguish, remorse, and humiliation not compensable under Iowa dram shop statute on parent’s claim brought under Iowa R.Civ.P. 8 against liquor licensee
- dramshop act found exclusive remedy against licensees, but not employees of licensees, since the latter was not named in the act
- common law cause of action not preempted if act of permit-tee is not covered by the act
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Gail v. Clark, 1987 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1254 (1987)
347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1987), overruled on other grounds by Gail v. Clark, 410 N.W.2d 662
The opinion
UHLENHOPP, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I think the majority opinion will come as quite a surprise to the General Assembly. For generations the Assembly has prescribed the civil liability and the ambit of it arising from dramshop operations. Now the majority has opened the entire field: licensees and permittees have strict liability for serving persons who are intoxicated or to the point of intoxication, plus common-law liability for serving intoxicants negligently; and their employees have common-law liability for serving intoxicants negligently.
The issue here is one of preemption— whether by statute the General Assembly preempted the field of tort liability of dramshop personnel. Preemption is basically a question of the intention of the legislative body. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 , 97 S.Ct. 1305 , 51 L.Ed.2d 604 , rehearing denied, 431 U.S. 925 , 97 S.Ct. 2201 , 53 L.Ed.2d 240 (1977).
Formerly the General Assembly had two dramshop acts, a broad form and a narrow form. Iowa Code §§ 129.2 , 123.95 (1971). The broad form in section 129.2 covered the serving, of intoxicants by “any person” and it covered serving intoxicants “contrary to the provisions of this title [title VI on alcoholic beverages]”. The narrow form in section 123.95 covered serving by “any licensee or permittee” and it covered serving intoxicants to a person “while he is intoxicated” or “to a point where such person is intoxicated”.
The General Assembly revised title VI and in the process repealed the broad form and retained the narrow form, which is section 123.92 of the current Code. That section also requires a licensee or permittee to file proof of financial responsibility — an insurance policy or bond. Iowa Code § 123.92 (1983).
By its revision of the dramshop legislation the General Assembly brought about two main results. First, by limiting the *391 dramshop act to serving by “any licensee or permittee” instead of “any person”, the Assembly took dramshop employees out of the dramshop act. For the reasons stated by Justice Larson, however, I cannot believe that the Assembly intended employees should have no liability at all. More likely' an employee would have whatever liability exists outside the strict liability of the dramshop act, that is; the damaged person would have to prove negligence on the part of the employee who served the intoxicants. I thus think that employees are not liable under the dramshop act but are liable for their negligence.
Second, by the same limitation to “any licensee or permittee” instead of “any person”, the Assembly expressly kept licensees and permittees under the dramshop act. By so doing the Assembly kept licensees and permittees strictly liable and obligated to post proof of financial responsibility, but it narrowed their liability from serving a person “contrary to the provisions of this title” to serving a person “while he or she is intoxicated” or “to a point where he or she is intoxicated”. For the reasons stated by Justice Harris, I believe the dramshop act preempts the tort field as to the expressly-covered licensees and permit-tees. I also believe that to hold a licensee or permittee under respondeat superior for conduct of an employee, the employee must serve a person who is intoxicated or serve a person to a point of intoxication. Otherwise the statutory condition under which licensees and permittees are made liable would be undercut.
This construction of the act seems to me most likely to reflect legislative intent, based on the present language of the act and the history of this area of law.