holding that election laws should be liberally interpreted so as to allow the candidate to stand for election
How later courts described this case
- holding that election laws should be liberally interpreted so as to allow the candidate to stand for election
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result announced by the majority opinion because the decision of the Franklin Circuit Judge was not clearly erroneous. It is an unquestioned fundamental rule of appellate practice that the judgment of the trier of fact should be affirmed if it is free of error. Findings of fact in support of a judgment should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous with due regard being given to the opportunity of the trial judge to consider the credibility of the witnesses. CR 52.01. Obviously, the trial judge is in the very best position to ascertain the credibility of those who testify before that judge.
Election contests or matters related to elections should be governed by the standard of review of a civil action. Cf. Deaton v. Little, Ky., 452 S.W.2d 384 (1969). The Supreme Court in its appellate capacity is bound by the findings of fact of the trial judge unless there is clear error or an abuse of discretion. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Herald, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 804 (1992).
The crux of this case is whether candidate Fletcher conducted a sufficiently extensive investigation into the residency of his Lieutenant Governor running mate. The trial judge found that he had done so and no reversible error has been demonstrated so as to produce a contrary result.
There is no doubt that the Lieutenant Governor candidate did not satisfy the requirements of the law as to residency as initially determined by the Oldham Circuit Judge. However, that is not dispositive of the issue here. The true question is whether candidate Fletcher had a valid reason to accept the legal advice and statements of his running mate and others. That question has already been resolved by the Franklin Circuit Judge. There is no reason to overturn his decision.
I fully concur with the statements in the majority opinion which cite with approval the observation of previous cases in regard to the proper approach to election law disputes. I particularly agree with the philosophies expressed in part in Queenan v. Mimms, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 380 (1955); Greene v. Slusher, 300 Ky. 715 , 190 S.W.2d 29 (1945); Baker v. Marcum, 216 Ky. 210 , 287 S.W. 696 (1926) and Napier v. Roberts, 172 Ky. 227 , 189 S.W. 206 (1916).
To paraphrase Marcum, supra, the interpretation of election laws must be along *406 reasonable lines and not so ultra-technical as to unnecessarily burden the voters. Every effort should be put forward so as to allow the voters in any election, primary or general, to fully and with reasonable intelligence exercise their right to vote.